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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO MARKET EFFICIENCY 
I believe there is no other proposition in economics which has 
more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis... In the literature of finance, accounting, and the 
economics of uncertainty, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is 
accepted as a fact of life. (Jensen, 1978) 
The efficient-market hypothesis is the most remarkable error 
in the history of economics. (Shiller, 1987) 
Whenever prices of assets or commodities change dramatically, the 
fortunes of some market participants are made while the fortunes of others 
are lost. For centuries the lure of these changes in wealth have driven 
some people, like gamblers to a roulette wheel, to try their hand at 
predicting the next price change hoping to profit from it. From astrology 
to tea leaves, from the value analysis of the 1930s to the candlestick 
charting of today, many methods of price forecasting have tried to unlock 
the secrets of the future. Can price forecasts be used as the key to 
limitless wealth and abundance? The theory of efficient markets answers a 
resounding "No." 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) holds that capital asset prices 
fully and correctly reflect all relevant public information. Given 
appropriate assumptions^, when prices "fully reflect" relevant 
information, all asset expected returns will be equal. Prices "correctly 
reflect" information if agent expectations are rational. This definition 
is embodied in the following mathematical model: 
^Typical assumptions include: l)a large number of homogeneous, profit-
maximizing agents with rational expectations, 2)all information is 
costlessly available and arrives at the market randomly, and 3)agents 
rapidly adjust prices to reflect new information. 
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(1.1) = r 
with r a constant, E the expectations operator, an information set 
available at the start of period t, and t:he return to asset i 
realized at the end of period t. Return is defined as: 
(1.2) 
V . t 
with. ^ the price of asset i at the beginning of period t, and the 
dividend paid by asset i at the end of period t. Recursive solution 
techniques for after substituting (1.2) into (1.1) together with the 
transversality condition that price grows at a rate less than 1+r^, yield 
the familiar model of price as the discounted sum of future dividends; 
(1.3) P, = ^  B 
where B is the discount factor l/(l+r). For an asset with no dividends, 
the measure of return would just be the capital gain: 
(1.2') - 1 
Solving recursively, one obtains: 
(1.3') 
2This assumption rules out speculative bubbles. Bubbles are 
inconsistent with an efficient market. 
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Its Beginnings 
Efficient market theory began with the random walk hypothesis 
developed in the 1950s. In a study of stock market advice from twenty 
insurance companies, sixteen financial services, twenty-five publications, 
and one highly regarded financial editor, Cowles (1933) found investment 
results no better than with random portfolios. In a similar vein, Working 
(1934) noted that a time series of successive changes in wheat prices was 
indistinguishable from a random-difference series. While these early 
researchers hinted at problems with the current investment theory of 
fundamental and technical analysis, Kendall (1953) had the first major 
statistical study of serial correlation. He failed to find significant 
serial correlation in price changes of selected British stocks and U.S. 
commodities, Kendall concluded that successive price changes were 
independent and random behavior was vastly more important to price than 
systematic effects. While much of the early random walk research focused 
on commodity prices, Fama (1965) studied stock price behavior. Although 
the data series were rather short, Fama found that first-differences of 
daily stock prices in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average looked like a 
sequence of drawings of independent, identically distributed random 
variables. Price changes mimicked a random walk. Fama (1965, page 90) 
first used the phrase "efficient market." 
Fama (1970), LeRoy (1989) and others credit Samuelson (1965) and 
Mandelbrot (1966) with giving economic content to efficient market theory. 
The random walk hypothesis (RWH) was an ad hoc approach used to explain the 
apparently random moves of prices. With a simple agricultural model of 
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weather and prices, Mandelbrot showed how prices could be generated by a 
martingale process^. The martingale model was considered a substantial 
improvement in efficient market theory because it can be derived from 
assumptions of preferences and returns (LeRoy, 1989). 
Fama et al, (1969) had one of the first empirical studies to examine 
how information was reflected into stock prices. Fama found that stock 
prices adjusted very rapidly to information about stock splits. Because of 
this speedy price adjustment once information on splits became public, no 
excess returns obtain based on that information. Fama (1970) also had the 
seminal survey in the efficient market literature. There, he delineated 
three forms of efficiency^, recognized the martingale model as the 
standard for efficient markets, and reviewed current empirical tests of the 
RWH and the martingale.^ 
The zenith of the EMH occurred during the 1970s after Fama's lengthy 
survey about the time of Jensen (1978) from which the first introductory 
stochastic process is a martingale if - X^. The 
martingale model is less restrictive than the random walk model since the 
latter requires complete statistical independence of successive price 
changes while the former needs only the mean of the distributions of each 
price change variable (e.g., Pt+l'^t^ be independent of information 
available at t. 
^Weak form efficiency: all past price information was reflected in 
current price; semi-strong form: all public information was reflected in 
current price; strong form: all public and private information was 
reflected in current price. 
^The primary evidence against the RWH was the empirical finding that 
"large daily price changes tend to be followed by large changes, but of 
unpredictable sign" (Fama, 1970, page 415). If the second moment of the 
return distributions was predictable and non-constant through time, 
independence was violated and the random walk model was inappropriate. 
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quote comes. By the late 1970s, most conclusions of broad international 
research were consistent with the EMH. Some anomalous evidence, though, 
had been found. Small but significant excess returns were uncovered using 
information in public announcements of dividends and earnings, Jensen 
(1978). This small crack in the foundation of efficient market theory was 
the harbinger of a vast literature documenting numerous anomalies of and 
other problems with the EMH. This literature is described in the next 
section. 
The intuitive idea of market efficiency is that agents make optimal 
use of all available information in bidding for assets. If "fundamental 
value" is defined as the discounted sum of optimal expectations of future 
earnings (cash flow, dividends, etc.), there are two implications of both 
the model of market efficiency and the intuition: a) price will always 
equal fundamental value, and b) future returns will not be forecastable 
with information available at the time price is observed. Extending 
current research in finance by testing the second implication in a futures 
market setting is the goal of this study. 
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CHAPTER II: EFFICIENT MARKET ANOMALIES 
Even as the EMH received broad academic support through the mid-
1970s, several first-order questions or contradictions remained. First, if 
asset prices fully reflect all information, any analysis of public 
information would be useless. Yet, investment traditionalists of the 
Graham and Dodd school believe that careful analysis of public information 
will consistently produce above average portfolio returns. Technical 
analysts study chart patterns of past prices for insight into future price 
direction. For decades, legions of analysts have been employed by 
financial companies and advisory services hoping to consistently out­
perform market averages by expert stock picking and market timing. Since 
the efficient market price is an optimal estimate of fundamental value and 
returns are unforecastable, this employment is clearly inappropriate and 
yet it occurs. 
The large volume of trade on security exchanges is a second anomaly. 
Rational sellers must realize that buyers choose to buy based on the 
buyers' interpretation of the buyers' own information which may differ from 
the sellers'. Since both buyers and sellers cannot have positive expected 
gain, risk-averse agents would not trade. Current trade volume is much too 
large to be motivated solely by new purchases or portfolio rebalancing for 
risk as the EMH suggests. 
A third contradiction involves the assumption that information is 
costlessly available to all agents. In reality, information is difficult 
and costly to acquire and once acquired may be even harder to interpret. 
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Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) point out that only the opportunity for 
arbitrage profits gives traders the incentive to gather information. The 
inherent contradiction between these incentives and market efficiency 
results in an inability to maintain capital market equilibrium. Once 
equilibrium is established, arbitrage possibilities and the consequent 
incentives to acquire information disappear. Soon, prices will no longer 
fully and correctly reflect information. If more people believed in semi-
strong form efficiency, fewer would gather information. 
Other questions arose. Why do closed-end mutual funds typically sell 
at substantial discounts? Arbitragers should buy the mutual fund and sell 
the individual stocks for a riskless profit. Buffett (1985) pointed to 
four investors of the Graham and Dodd school of fundamental analysis who 
consistently outperformed market averages during the 1960s and 1970s each 
in his own separate business.^ Neither would be observed if the market 
was strictly efficient. 
By the early 1980s, research began to uncover second-order or more 
technical evidence questioning the unpredictability implication of the EMH. 
This literature is well surveyed by LeRoy (1989, 1990), Fortune (1991) and 
Jacobs and Levy (1988). Small firms tended to experience greater returns 
than large firms. On average, investment returns for January outpaced 
those of any other month, while weekends were far worse for stocks than 
other days. Stocks that paid large dividends were punished with smaller 
^While it is statistically possible for individuals to outguess the 
market on occasion, Buffett's point is the number and consistency of his 
group cannot be reconciled with the EMH. 
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than average total returns, implying that investors value high dividend 
stocks and keep their prices bid high. Returns were also negatively 
correlated with various proxies for price to value ratios, e.g., price to 
earnings or price to book value. Investors could earn abnormal profits 
buying stocks with low ratios. Then there was the Value Line enigma. For 
several consecutive years, stocks with a "1" rating by Value Line 
Investment Survey substantially outperformed stocks rated "5" giving 
credence to the existence of stock picking ability. 
In response to this accumulated evidence, Jensen (1978) redefined an 
efficient market by linking it with transaction and information gathering 
costs. "A market is efficient with respect to an information set, if it is 
impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of that 
information set"^. This change allowed limited price change 
predictability to coincide with these stylized facts but not enough 
predictability for abnormal profits. The link of efficiency with the 
absence of excess profits has endured to the present day. 
Prior to the early 1980s, research focused on specific deviations 
from market efficiency for small portfolios of selected stocks and 
relatively short time periods. The excess volatility studies of Shiller 
(1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) that followed large groups of stocks 
with very long price series inaugurated a new era in efficient market 
research. Mean reversion and overreaction were later branches of this new 
approach. The EMH assumes agents are rational in their decision-making. 
^Jensen (1978) page 96. 
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Negating this assumption has been suggested as a unifying explanation of 
the results of this new research. These four areas will be discussed next 
beginning with excess volatility. 
Excess Volatility 
A decade of excess volatility research began with the studies by 
Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981). With hindsight their intuition 
is amazingly simple. If price is the optimal forecast of discounted future 
dividends as postulated by the EMH, then price should be less variable® 
than dividends. If we define as the fundamental value of the asset, 
that is, the price that would obtain if dividends were perfectly 
forecastable, and = P*j--P^ is the forecast error, then from (1.3) we 
have 
(2.1) Pg = Effp;) 
and 
(2.2) P'c = Pc+ej. . 
Pj. is an optimal forecast of P*^  since it is made using all available 
information. This implies that P^. and are uncorrelated so that 
var{P^.+€^.) - varfP^) + varle^.). Variance is a nonnegative number, so 
taking the variance of both sides of (2.2) yields the inequality 
(2.3) vax(Pl) ^vaziPg) . 
Thus, the variance of the fundamental value of the asset should be at least 
®Less variable in a clearly defined and measurable way. 
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as large as the variance of the optimal forecast. Shiller found just the 
opposite. The variance of price was significantly greater than a 
mathematically derived variance bound based on the realized dividend 
stream. LeRoy and Porter reported a similar variance bound violation. 
Even though Shiller's work was questioned on econometric grounds such as 
small sample bias of variance estimates (Flavin, 1983) and flawed 
stationarity assumptions (Kleidon, 1986), his paper began a revolution in 
market efficiency research. 
Rationality in Decision-Making 
Along with the martingale model described in Section I, the EMH 
assumes each agent's preferences correspond to the axioms of expected 
utility theory such that choices are determined by maximizing expected 
utility. Expectations are rational, i.e. agents know and use the correct 
distribution of possible outcomes in forming expectations. In reality, 
assessing probabilities and assigning values to potential choices is a 
highly complex judgmental process. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggest 
that people use a few heuristic principles or "rules of thumb" to simplify 
this effort. Three such rules identified to reduce the complexity of 
processing information are: anchoring and adjustment, representativeness, 
and availability.9 "These heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they 
lead to severe and systematic errors" (page 2). The representativeness 
rule of thumb is used when agents take recent events to be more 
^See Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and other referenced works by these 
authors for explanations of anchoring and adjustment and availability. 
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representative of the true probability distribution than distant past 
events. In other words, people tend to put more subjective weight on 
recent events than is warranted by objective probabilities. This violates 
Bayes' Theorem for updating probabilities and can lead to systematic 
overreaction in financial markets. Camerer (1987), though, suggests that 
the small violations observed in practice may not be economically 
significant and probably disappear with experience. 
Much research on violations of rationality comes from psychology and 
is performed in experimental settings. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and 
Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) discuss the preference reversal 
phenomenon. The manner in which a decision or problem is framed can change 
the preferred solution and often can affect that choice in a predictable 
way. Weinstein (1980) uses surveys and a controlled experiment in two 
studies to show that people believe their own chances for receiving good 
luck and avoiding misfortune are greater than the average person's chances. 
Weinstein labels this error in judgement "unrealistic optimism." This 
could explain why many people attempt to beat the market and continue the 
attempts even after initial loss and disappointment. Martin (1985) surveys 
these and other anomalous behaviors that do not correspond to the EMH 
model. In a lengthy and detailed overview, Thaler (1987) points out that 
economic theory has two roles: normative and descriptive. While expected 
utility theory may be considered the ideal for how agents should choose 
(normative), there is ample evidence that it does not adequately describe 
how agents in fact do choose. 
Economic modelling in response to suggestions of market irrationality 
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allowed some agents to be irrational. Traditional theory dating from 
Freidman (1953) assumed that smart money arbitragers would soon take 
advantage of the resulting profit opportunities and correct all market 
inefficiencies. Newer models with quasi-rational agents or noise traders, 
however, show that markets cannot guarantee that only rational behavior 
will survive (Russell and Thaler, 1985, and DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (DSSW), 1991). With noise traders in a model other studies 
conclude that speculation can be destabilizing^® rather than serve to 
reduce price variance. 
Overreaction 
The application of this work in psychology to economics is 
straightforward. If agents make systematic errors in decision-making or 
probability assessment, then asset prices, which presuppose a forward-
looking assessment of probabilities, contain systematic errors and the EMH 
would fail. An example of overweighing recent information is myopic 
extrapolation of a recent trend--a sure way to produce price overreaction. 
"Prices have risen recently so they must keep rising" or the "greater fool 
theory" outline phenomena described many times. Financial lore is replete 
l^For examples of models with destabilizing speculation, see Stein 
(1987), DSSW (1989), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) and Hart and Kreps 
(1986). 
l^The results in many noise trader models are driven by the creation 
of an additional risk for investors--risk that price will diverge further 
from or never return to fundamental value, Thus, agents can never be 
certain that the inefficiencies they might be tempted to arbitrage against 
will ever be corrected. 
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with legendary examples of such past investment manias, from the Tulip Bulb 
mania in Holland in the 1600s to Florida land speculation in the 1920s. 
Overreaction research began with Beaver and Landsman (1980). They 
form a portfolio of winners (losers) based on a positive (negative) 
immediate past residual return (CAPM-type residual) and observe subsequent 
portfolio return. They find some abnormal returns associated with the 
method of portfolio formation. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) refined this 
strategy and asked whether past stock price returns could predict future 
returns. Past extreme returns were used as a proxy for overreaction and 
two portfolios of stocks were formed on that basis. The winner (loser) 
portfolio was comprised of stocks whose previous three year returns were in 
the top (bottom) ten percent of all stocks considered. The EMH implies 
both portfolios have the same expected return, i.e., past returns offer no 
clue to future performance. From 1926 to 1982, winner portfolios under-
performed the market by 5.0% but loser portfolios beat the market averages 
by 19.6%. This difference in cumulative average returns of 24.6% was 
statistically significant. It appears that returns were predictable for 
that period. Shiller (1984, 1988), Summers (1986), and Black (1986), among 
others, had discussed fashions, fads, bubbles and noise as explanations of 
Shiller's excess volatility in the broader framework of violations of 
rationality suggested by the research in psychology. But DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) moved directly from the systematic cognitive error to an 
empirical study of the systematic failure of the EMH. A large literature 
l^These are well documented by Kindleberger (1989). 
on overreaction followed that is well sununarized in DeBondt (1988) . 
Strong evidence of short term stock price reversals were found by 
Howe (1986) and Brown and Harlow (1988). Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) 
studied stock price reaction to announcements of specific events and found 
overreaction to new negative information. In Lehraann (1990), winner and 
loser portfolios experience sizeable weekly return reversals even after 
accounting for bid-ask spreads. Similar conclusions are drawn from Bremer 
and Sweeney's (1991) study of extremely large negative ten day returns for 
specific stocks. Price moved up in subsequent days. Overreaction to 
information was also discovered in S&P 100 index options by Stein (1989) 
and in the forecasts of security analysts by DeBondt and Thaler (1990). So 
much research has focused on this subject that some academicians have named 
it the Overreaction Hypothesis (ORH). 
Mean Reversion 
If asset prices are excessively volatile, they would be too high at 
some times, be too low at others, and gravitate to the fundamental or mean 
value in between. If prices do revert to a mean value, returns would be 
serially correlated. Returns would therefore be predictable, negating 
market efficiency. This suggests testing asset prices for mean reversion 
and returns for autocorrelation. Fama (1970) documents early research 
finding very small serial correlation in daily and weekly stock returns. 
However, he concludes that after accounting for transaction costs, the 
near-zero autocorrelations imply this predictability of returns is not 
economically significant. Summers (1986) questions this conclusion. With 
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a simple model of price containing a slowly decaying, autoregressive 
component (fads), Summers shows that small serial correlations allow 
substantial divergence from fundamental value for long periods that will 
neither be detected by econometricians nor arbitraged away. 
While studying differences in variance of daily versus weekend or 
holiday stock returns, French and Roll (1986) discover small but 
significant negative correlation of daily returns at lags up to six days. 
Fama and French (1988) model price as the sum of random walk and stationary 
components. Their evidence from sixty years of stock returns matches the 
prediction of the model: a U-shaped pattern of negative autocorrelations, 
from zero at short lags, becoming more negative, than decaying slowly back 
to zero at longer horizons. Evidence from variance ratio tests by Poterba 
and Summers (1988) shows positive (negative) serial correlation of monthly 
stock returns at short (long) horizons. Similar results are found in 
equity returns in seventeen other countries. Using a Markov chain model 
with postwar U.S. stock prices, McQueen and Thorley (1991) also find 
reversal of returns such that "low (high) returns tend to follow runs of 
high (low) returns." 
Other Evidence of Inefficiency 
Financial practitioners have long believed that price-earnings or 
price-dividend ratios contain information about future price changes. A 
ratio substantially below some market average would indicate an "out of 
favor" stock with a high reward to risk potential. Shiller (1988), 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988) document the success 
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of this strategy. Dividends and earnings both predict long horizon stock 
returns. 
An efficient market price is the optimal forecast of the asset's 
fundamental value. Any change in that price must reflect new information 
about current and future fundamentals and economic conditions. Utilizing 
this implication, a wholly different line of research seeks to explain the 
price variation ex post by referring to changing economic conditions and 
firm-specific events. In his orange juice study, Roll (1984) failed to 
find any explanatory variable besides cold weather that had enduring effect 
on returns of frozen concentrated orange juice futures. Applying this 
methodology to the stock market, Roll (1988) could explain no more than 
one-third of the variability of monthly stock returns. Fama (1990) 
combined proxies for "shocks to expected cash flows, time-varying expected 
returns, and shocks to expected returns" and was able to explain up to 59% 
of the variation of total annual stock return. Roll concluded that a 
market influenced by fads, fashions or psychological factors was consistent 
with his findings. Fama left conclusions to the reader. 
The last efficient market anomaly is more anecdotal than academic. A 
few investors have consistently and spectacularly beaten market averages. 
Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway, George Soros of Quantum Fund and 
Peter Lynch of Fidelity's Magellan Fund are three such people. Marcus 
(1990) develops a methodology to assess the performance of winners selected 
ex post. His conclusion is that the Magellan Fund's superlative record was 
due to more than luck. Finally, even though the decisions of one person 
may not be indicative of the feelings of a larger group, it is interesting 
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that one of the fathers of modern portfolio theory, Nobel laureate William 
Sharpe, has left academia to counsel pension funds and private clients in 
asset allocation and market timing (Berss, 1990). 
Because of their intuitive similarities, excess volatility, 
overreaction and mean reversion are likely all part of the same market 
phenomenon. Call it the "return reversal" effect: prices overshoot and 
then correct back. This price action would explain both the negative 
autocorrelations found in empirical research and the failure of 
orthogonality tests between future price and proxies for fundamental value-
-price/earnings, price/book value, etc. Practitioners Jacobs and Levy 
(1988, 1989) used multivariate regression of monthly stock returns on 
proxies for twenty-five different market anomalies to disentangle the 
interwoven effects of the anomalies. Return reversal had the strongest 
pure effect of any of the anomalies they studied.The point of these 
comments is to note that if all this varied research is only measuring 
different forms of the same effect then the evidence against market 
efficiency is not necessarily so weighty. 
Return reversals can arise from systematic overweighing of new 
information and were identified in the psychology literature discussed 
above. Reversals can also be a reflection of "noise"--the confusion added 
to asset prices by agents' uncertainty, misperception, or misinterpretation 
of random daily events. Positive feedback loops accentuate the reversal 
l^ocher market anomalies with strong pure effects were low price-
earnings ratios, small size, trends in analyst's earnings estimates and 
relative strength. 
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and are part of this effect. Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990) and DSSW 
(1989) discuss and model the role of feedback traders who base their demand 
for assets on realized returns. Soros (1987) admits his investment success 
was largely an exploitation of what he calls "reflexivity" or grand 
feedback loops on a broad macroeconomic scale. "The trend is your friend", 
"get on the bandwagon" and "buy relative strength" are common descriptions 
of feedback effects. Reversals occur when these feedback loops break. 
Evidence Against Inefficiency 
As the evidence against the EMH accumulated, two rebuttal strategies 
followed. One strategy showed that the modern supposed inefficiencies 
(excess volatility, overreaction and mean reversion) were either 
nonexistent, weak, or subsumed by already well-known anomalies. The early 
statistical criticism of Shiller's volatility tests is well-publicized. 
Flavin (1983) noted possible small sample bias while Marsh and Merton 
(1986) and Kleidon (1986) attacked the tests on grounds of non-
stationarity. Mankiw et al. (1991) test market efficiency with stock price 
and a naive forecast of the perfect foresight price. Their test with 
"superior statistical qualities" rejects the EMH but only at marginal 
significance levels. 
In a reappraisal of mean reversion evidence, Kim, Nelson, and Startz 
(1991) decompose the sample of Fama and French (1988) into two subperiods: 
1926 to 1946 and 1947 to 1986 or pre- and post-World War II. While mean 
reversion was found in the former and highly volatile period, the post-war 
period exhibits significant positive rather than negative serial 
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correlation or "mean aversion." They conclude the market underwent a 
fundamental change in structure after the war. Jagadeesh (1991) finds mean 
reversion only in January with no serial correlation in any other month. 
Overreaction is criticized in a number of papers. Contrary to the 
ORH, Davidson and Dutia (1989) find positive serial correlation of annual 
returns in their large sample of stocks over twenty-one years. The 
portfolio formation technique and the time span of Davidson and Dutia are 
quite different from DeBondt and Thaler (1985) (D&T). According to Zarowin 
(1989) , the overreaction of D&T is just another example of the "small 
stock" anomaly since losers are clearly companies of smaller market 
capitalization than winners. By individually analyzing the size 
characteristics of companies in the seventeen different portfolios, he 
shows that returns from portfolios of equal size winners and losers are 
almost identical. Chan (1988) assumes company size matters and finds that 
portfolio betas change from rank to test period. Betas of loser (winner) 
portfolios increase (decrease) significantly from rank to test period 
indicating that portfolio risk and the consequent expected return increases 
(decreases). Risk changes result from changes in company debt to equity 
ratios. After accounting for this change in risk overreaction returns 
become economically insignificant. D&T (1987) respond to these criticisms 
by noting that winner (loser) portfolio betas are higher (lower) in down 
markets than in up markets. This contradicts Chan's conclusion that loser 
stocks are riskier than winner stocks. 
Another potential problem of overreaction research is survival bias. 
Long term studies of reversals require companies to remain in business for 
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the duration of the portfolio period. Excluding companies that file 
bankruptcy biases the study in favor of return reversal by eliminating one 
possibility: that extreme losers continue to be extreme losers during the 
test period. New or acquired companies may also be excluded, Phillips 
(1988) found bias of this type by comparing sample distributions of firms 
both inside and outside the universe from which research selections are 
commonly made. Only in-sample conclusions were deemed appropriate. 
The second general rebuttal to rejections of market efficiency notes 
that predictable stock returns can be consistent with efficient markets if 
the inefficiency arises from time-varying expected returns. A typical 
reformulation of the present value model is 
where r^ is the expected return for period t. If expected returns are 
nonrandom, asset returns can be predicted from information available at t. 
Further, if arbitragers cannot profit from that predictability, e.g., 
because of risk aversion or opportunity costs, serially correlated returns 
would be consistent with an equilibrium model of asset-pricing. Balvers, 
Cosimano and McDonald (1990) and Cecchetti, Lara and Mark (1990) present a 
theoretical model in which agents' desire to smooth consumption leads to 
negative serial correlation of returns. In Balvers, et al, stock returns 
can be predicted to the extent that aggregate output is serially 
correlated. For example, anticipation of a shortage next period leads to a 
demand for assets to carry wealth forward thereby increasing asset prices 
( 2 . 4 )  
21 
and lowering expected returns. Attanasio (1991) acknowledges the evidence 
that stock returns in excess of treasury bill rates are predictable, but 
notes that if the variables (dividends, earnings, inflation, and bill 
rates) that predict these returns also predict return variance, they merely 
proxy for risk and the EMH is not rejected. His results are mixed; 
heteroscedasticity eliminates the predictive power of dividends and 
treasury rates but not of inflation. Extensive work by Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1991) showing serial correlation in many asset markets in thirteen 
countries find evidence for several reasons to discount the expected 
returns explanation of market inefficiencies. Three such reasons are 
alternating autocorrelation sign at short versus long horizons, the size of 
the risk premium found in Mehra and Prescott (1985), and the similarity of 
observed autocorrelation in many different markets where vastly different 
risk factors are assumed to be operating. They conclude that observed 
patterns "are best explainable as a consequence of the speculative process 
itself" with fad or feedback models. 
A key problem of interpretation of all empirical tests of market 
efficiency is the joint nature of the hypothesis being tested. The EMH 
assumes agents are rational, homogeneous and use rational expectations. In 
addition, every hypothesis includes a specific mathematical model. Any 
test which rejects efficiency may only be rejecting one of these joint 
hypotheses. 
The next section looks at the efficiency testing literature in 
futures markets. 
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CHAPTER III: FUTURES MARKET EFFICIENCY AND ANOMALIES 
I take it as axiomatic that the markets are not 
informationally efficient. (Leistner, 1987) 
Futures markets, particularly of agricultural commodities, have been 
an integral part of the U.S. economy for many years. With the recent 
advent of futures markets in financial instruments, the volume of trading 
on futures exchanges has skyrocketed. These futures contracts based on 
non-physical assets such as stock and commodity indices, U.S. bills, bonds 
and notes. Eurodollars and foreign currencies, unimagined just a few years 
ago, now trade on organized exchanges all around the world. The routine 
daily volume of S&P 500 index futures substantially exceeds that of the New 
York Stock Exchange (Stein, 1987). While much economic research and 
complex statistical testing has addressed the question of financial market 
efficiency, application of these methodologies to futures markets has 
lagged. The surging volume of futures trading indicates it is time to 
catch up. 
A futures contract is a legal sales contract in which the seller 
promises to deliver a specified quantity of an asset of a certain quality 
to the buyer at one of several defined places within a small range of 
delivery dates. An exchange clearing-house insures the transaction so 
actual contact between the parties is not necessary. The contracts expire 
on the final date with either physical delivery of the underlying asset or 
cash settlement based on contract price at expiration. Markets for futures 
contracts fulfill several valuable economic services. Hedging the risk of 
inventory price fluctuation is one of the most important roles. Futures 
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markets also aggregate diverse information from traders and the resulting 
"consensus" price conveys that information to other market participants. 
This price discovery role helps establish cash prices in the underlying 
market. Futures markets also provide a physical place to trade open to 
all, offer liquidity for quick and easy market entry and exit, and help 
spread seasonal production throughout the calendar year with the use of 
diverse contract maturities (Scholes, 1981 and Grossman, 1986). 
Futures market efficiency is commonly defined in terms of the fair 
game model. Let F^ g be the futures price at time t of an asset to be 
delivered during period s and Cg be the "spot" or cash price of the asset 
at time s. Neglecting basis problems, the futures price for a contract in 
the delivery period will equal the spot price of the underlying asset or 
Fg g = Cg. With risk neutral agents, a constant interest rate and price 
equality in the delivery period, the fair game model implies 
( 3 . 1 )  -  C ,  I  J ; )  = 0  
or 
( 3 . 2 )  F g , .  =  E ( C ,  I  I , )  .  
Risk aversion could be added to the model in equation (3.2) by an additive 
risk premium^^ or by a multiplicative factor^^. Intuitively, equation 
l^This was shown in Koppenhaver (1983), e.g., F^ g^Cg-R^ g, where Rj. g 
is the risk premium. 
l^Bigman, Goldfarb, and Schechtman use the marginal rate of 
intertemporal substitution as the risk factor: e.g., 
(continued...) 
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(3.2) means today's futures price is a rational estimate of tomorrow's spot 
price. As is true in the financial markets described above, no current 
information should help predict the change in the spot or futures price 
from one period to the next. 
Two methods have traditionally been employed to test for futures 
market efficiency. The first method operationalizes (3.2) to yield the 
regression equation 
where i is the number of days or weeks before delivery, (0^,81) are the 
regression coefficients and Eg is the independent, identically distributed 
(iid) regression error. Efficiency implies the testable restriction 
(a,A)=(0,l), with an F-statistic to test the joint hypothesis. An 
alternative of this method regresses the forecast error on a vector of 
current information variables, Yg.^. 
Significant coefficients in the 6^^ vector would reject market efficiency. 
Variations of these tests have been often used to study futures efficiency 
with inconsistent results depending on the underlying asset and the sample. 
One minor problem with this test is the inclusion of Cg in (3.3) 
15(...continued) 
respectively, and Rjç is a measure of ownership risk for period k to 
k+1. 
( 3 . 3 )  C g  =  
( 3 . 4 )  H  
\ t ' ' k'C , 
where dU() is the marginal utility function evaluated at s and t. 
which adds data to the regression that was not available ex ante (at time 
s-i) to forecasting agents.Ideally, a test of efficiency would be 
based on only current information. However, a more fundamental problem is 
the nonstationarity of both price series. Elam and Dixon (1988) show that 
certain futures prices are nonstationary and the theoretical infinite 
variance of such series invalidates the standard F-tests.^^ Shen and 
Wang (1990) present a cointegration technique to surmount these statistical 
problems. Lai and Lai (1991) strongly reject efficiency in four London 
metal futures with this method. Chowdbury (1991) finds cointegration of 
spot and futures prices in five foreign currencies which is a necessary 
condition for efficiency but rejects the unbiasedness restrictions on 
equation (3.3). 
The second research method used to test futures market efficiency 
studies market timing ability and trading rule profitability. Profits 
above transactions costs from trading rules or market timing are evidence 
of inefficiency. Research indicates that test results depend on the rule, 
the asset and the sample period, so the evidence against efficiency lacks 
persuasiveness. Taylor (1983, 1985) and Taylor and Tari (1988) uncover 
limited profitability from filter rules based on observed small 
l^This was pointed out in Chowdbury (1991). A. model is estimated over 
the whole sample and then used for prediction within the sample. If the 
underlying processes are stationary, this may not be a serious problem. 
l^Elam and Dixon point out that Dickey-Fuller tables are inappropriate 
when both sides of the regression equation have different series, as in 
(3.3). Their solution is to use the following: Cg - aj^+b^*Cg.j^+e^. If Cg 
has a unit root, the distribution of the OLS estimator of b skews left 
while the critical value moves right and the test rejects too often. In 
this case the Dickey-Fuller tables provide the proper adjustment. 
autocorrelations of futures prices or price trends. So some information 
must be reflected slowly by the market. Cumby and Modest (1987) develop 
and employ a new test for market timing ability but find variable success 
for foreign exchange advisory services. Similar inconsistent results are 
found by Irwin (1984), Lukac, Brorsen and Irwin (1988), Lukac and Brorsen 
(1989) and Ward, Irwin and Zulauf (1991). Using end-of-day reports of 
large traders by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Hartzmark (1991) 
demonstrates that "fortunes of individual futures traders are determined by 
luck, not forecast ability" (page 49). Also, trading rule tests are likely 
biased toward findings of efficiency. Anyone uncovering successful trading 
rules would probably use them for profit rather than for publication. 
If trading rules can be used profitably, some commodity funds, pools 
or trading advisors should perform very well. However, no definitive 
results were found in a survey of public fund studies. Elton, Gruber and 
Rentzler (1990) offer strong conclusions based on public records from 1980 
to 1988. Fund returns are extremely variable and generally less than rates 
on treasury bills. They conclude that predicting superior performance is 
not possible and investment portfolios should not include commodity funds. 
On the other hand, Irwin and Brorsen (1985), Irwin and Landa (1987) and 
Schneeweis, Savanayana and McCarthy (1991) all conclude that a small 
benefit may accrue to some diversification into commodities. 
Newer techniques that look for overreaction or mean reversion are 
more conclusive. Arbitraging the soybean crush (taking opposite positions 
in soybeans versus its crush products, oil and meal expecting the spread to 
revert to the "mean" cost of production) produces significant profits 
according to Johnson, Zulauf, Irwin and Gerlow (1991). Ma and Soenen 
(1988) find a relationship between gold and silver prices that can be 
profitably exploited: buy silver and sell gold, then reverse at appropriate 
times. Using the Cumby-Modest timing test, Jackson, Zulauf and Irwin (1991) 
find mean reversion in seven agricultural commodities and spreads between 
them. Excess profits are significant but depend on the commodity, the 
sample period and the lag length. In a study of the effects of daily price 
limits. Ma, Rao and Sears (1989) note decreased volatility consistent with 
the hypothesis that futures prices overreact. If price limits are a 
stabilizing influence, then noise, fads or overreaction must be present. 
Ma, Dare and Donaldson (1990) estimate ARIMA models for several futures 
contracts to be proxies for market expectations. They find price reversals 
following significant price changes when prices diverge far from the level 
predicted by the ARIMA model. 
While these newer studies offer more consistent conclusions about 
futures market efficiency, much more work needs to be done. The next two 
sections discuss interpretations of risk as applied to futures and present 
the methodology for the current study of futures. 
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CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY 
This research examines two questions. The first, whether past 
extreme returns have any potential to predict future returns, is studied 
by extending the methodology of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) to the futures 
market. They found that past extreme returns did have predictive power 
for future stock market returns. As noted in Section II, they ranked 
stocks by previous three year returns and formed winner (loser) 
portfolios of stocks having the highest (lowest) ten percent of returns. 
Contrary to the EMH, these two portfolios had significantly different 
realized returns. If results in futures are similar to results in 
stocks, futures prices may be responding to fads or fashions and at times 
diverge widely from some fundamental value. If that value for 
commodities is the cost of production, price will vary above or below it 
to encourage or discourage extra production as demand dictates. 
Production cost or profits would be the impetus causing price to revert 
to fundamental value. If that reversion is systematic, than prior 
extreme returns may have predictive power just as in stocks. 
The second question researched in this study concerns the existence 
of risk premiums in futures markets. It will be discussed at the end of 
Section V. The rest of this section describes the data and methodology 
used here and considers two possible objections to this extension into 
futures markets. 
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Data 
Monthly data was gathered on all futures contracts traded on North 
American futures exchanges between January, 1964 and April, 1992. There 
were fifty-three such contracts that traded on fourteen exchanges during 
that time. The contracts and exchanges are listed in Appendix A in 
Tables A.1 and A.3 respectively. Natural spreads between specific 
futures will also be studied as though a separate market existed for 
them.IB while spreads are simply linear combinations of two or more 
futures contracts, the difference or ratio between two futures prices 
contains relative information not available in either price alone. For 
producers, it is often the relative prices of two commodities that 
precipitate production decision. Thirteen widely followed and 
significant spreads are followed in this research and are listed in 
Appendix A, Table A.2. Most of the historical data was obtained from 
Technical Tools, Inc. and Dunn & Hargitt, two data service companies from 
Los Altos, California and Lafayette, Indiana, respectively.^^ Futures 
markets include agricultural commodities, metals, interest rate futures, 
index futures, currencies, petroleum and food products. 
^®A spread investment is a portfolio that is long the first contract 
and short the second. For the cattle feeding and soybean crush spreads, 
the portfolio is long feeder cattle and corn and short live cattle, and 
long soybean oil and soybean meal and short soybeans, respectively. The 
return on the spread is the return on the spread portfolio. 
l^Additional data was gleaned from statistical annuals of the 
Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Commodity Exchange, 
Inc., New York Cotton Exchange, International Money Market, and 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 
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Methodology 
To test for predictive power of past extreme returns in futures 
markets, monthly data on the futures contracts described above will be 
used. Long, continuous time series of monthly returns will be formed 
using these sixty-six price series. Since these investments have no 
dividends or other cash flows, investment return is simply the price 
change over the time period.^0 Define monthly return for futures 
market i and month t+1 as the ratio: 
( 4 . 1 )  -  4 ^  
where j is the contract delivery month.Monthly price is the closing 
price on the last Wednesday of non-delivery months.2% If that price is 
the consequence of a limit move, the next day's price is used. Four of 
the futures markets ceased trading for lack of volume during the sample 
period. Returns are used in those markets until trading becomes so 
sparse that there could be difficulty completing transactions. 
Similarly, the series of returns do not begin until open interest reaches 
The term "returns" is really a misnomer in futures markets. 
While margin must be deposited to assure contract fulfillment, Treasury 
Bills can be used with the depositor retaining the interest income so the 
opportunity cost is zero. Since no investment is required, returns have 
a zero divisor. 
Z^Index i-1,2,3,...,66 for the 53 futures plus 13 spreads. Index j 
ranges from January to December and varies for different i. Index 
t-1,2,3 340 or January, 1964 to April, 1992. 
^^This close was chosen to avoid any potential price disruptions on 
Mondays, Fridays or during delivery months. Monthly returns also 
overwhelm any common bid or ask price discrepancies. 
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several hundred and volume is at least several contracts per day. Such 
low volume and open interest, though, occur in only a few of the data 
series studied. 
On each portfolio selection or rank date, previous returns of all 
traded contracts are calculated^^ and are ranked in order from largest 
to smallest. D&T (1985) used three years for their rank period for 
portfolio selection. The shorter duration of futures contracts and the 
shorter horizon of commodity production cycles suggest that overreaction, 
if present, would appear after a rank period of twelve to eighteen 
months. Rank dates used are January and July of each year.^^ After 
ranking, about the top eighteen percent are put in a winner portfolio (W) 
and the bottom eighteen percent in a loser portfolio (L). All portfolio 
investments are purchase or "long" commitments and are equally dollar-
weighted, i.e., each portfolio is considered to have purchased a one 
dollar interest in the appropriate markets. Results of this study come 
from a comparison of post-selection returns^^ of these two portfolios. 
^^For any rank period of k months, the rank period return is 
calculated as: 
Rank periods studied were k=6,12,15,18,24 and 36 months. 
Z^Rank date index d-1,2,3,...56 or July, 1964 to January, 1992. For 
a six month rank period, d has 56 observations. Longer rank periods 
imply fewer observations. 
Z^Test returns are calculated every three months beginning the third 
month and ending at month thirty, The index is S where S-3,6,9,...,30 
months and s=0,l,...,S. Test period return for each future contract i 
(continued...) 
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Now, for every rank period k, rank date d and test period s, there 
are paired observations of portfolio test period returns, a s for 
winners and ^ g for losers. Define: 
( 4 . 2 )  d,B ^  ^ k. d, B~^ k, d. e 
and 
( 4 . 3 )  
\^d-l / 
No matter how portfolios W and L are formed, the EMH implies that the 
expected return of both portfolios should be the same or the expected 
average difference be zero.26 go, g^j^E^.(DBARjç g) = 0. But if D&T 
overreaction obtains, then DBARj^ g) <0 and statistically 
significant. The series, d,s' d=l,2,...,N where N is the number of 
rank periods possible between January, 1964 and April, 1992, can be 
divided into non-overlapping subperiods so statistical tests can be 
25(...continued) 
is : 
n t e ) -
The portfolio return, d s ^k d s• Che arithmetic average of the 
test period returns where t is the number of future contracts in each 
portfolio and and are the returns to the winning and losing 
contracts respectively. 
If, k.d.a 
26 
"ïfe'"••A-" 
This must be true since no current information can be used to 
predict future returns. 
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performed.27 The Student's t-statistic will test the hypothesis of no 
difference between portfolio means. 
Special Considerations 
Whether futures contracts can even be considered assets subject to 
financial modelling has been debated in the literature. Such contracts 
differ from customary investment vehicles in several ways. First, they 
are short-lived securities whose endogenous price and quantity can vary 
dramatically from day to day. Quantities of other assets are fixed in 
the short run. Furthermore, trading in futures markets is a closed, 
zero-sum process; neglecting commissions, the total money received by 
winners exactly equals the total given up by losers. Also, at the end of 
every trading session, losers must deposit additional margin and winners 
may receive their profit since the contract value is marked to zero at 
that time.28 In addition, the CAPM market portfolio will contain no 
futures contracts since the net investment in them is zero at all times. 
CAPM assumptions are not met by these characteristics (Stein, 1986). In 
spite of these differences, Black (1976), Scholes (1981) and Cox, 
^^For tests using the Student's t distribution each pair of 
observations must be statistically independent. If the rank periods 
overlap, obvious statistical dependence occurs. If only the rank and 
test periods overlap, the independence assumption is not strictly met. 
But with mostly different futures contracts in the winner and loser 
portfolios after each rank date, the assumption of independent 
observations is not unreasonable. Tests are performed on both the full 
series and smaller series with less overlaps. 
2®The price of every futures contract is zero at the beginning of 
every period. Returns need to be redefined and the CAPM model must be 
modified. See the next section. 
Ingersoll and Ross (1981) all conclude that "futures prices are equal to 
the value of particular assets, even though they are not in themselves 
asset prices" (Cox et al. 1981, page 321). Futures prices should satisfy 
models of asset-pricing like the CAPM or the APT. This research treats 
futures prices as asset prices. 
Intrinsic to this study is the formation of long time series of 
futures prices. Since most contracts trade actively for only a year or 
less, long price series cannot be created without splicing successive 
contracts. Assets that differ in time of delivery but are otherwise 
identical may be equally as different as stocks and bonds.^9 is this 
splicing appropriate? It could certainly add noise to the data and 
prevent definitive conclusions. Actively traded real assets, though, 
with long price series underlie every futures contract^® and futures 
prices must approach that cash price in every delivery month. In 
addition, most of the assets studied can be stored at least into the next 
delivery period and often beyond. The storage potential and long cash 
price series validate splicing from contract to contract. In reality, 
companies also change dramatically from period to period. For example, 
General Motors stock in 1970 represented a quite different asset than 
General Motors stock today, but all economic research still uses the long 
^^For example, corn for July delivery in a tight carryover year may 
be priced much differently than the same corn for December delivery if a 
large crop looms for the fall. 
^®This is true even though some futures are two or three steps 
removed from real assets. Even with index or currency futures, real 
assets form the basis for their existence. 
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price series of stocks. This essay will also use the long price series. 
One problem remains. As discussed above, time-varying expected 
returns or risk premiums could be one explanation for supposed market 
inefficiencies. If previous losers were substantially riskier than 
previous winners, significantly higher returns would be expected from the 
former portfolio as a reward to bearing risk. Since differential risk 
could account for such significantly different portfolio returns, 
economic research should only compare risk-adjusted returns. To account 
for differential risk, it must be measured. What is the risk of the 
winner and loser portfolios and how is the risk of each to be compared? 
These questions will be addressed in the next section. 
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CHAPTER V: RISK 
There is considerable controversy in the economic literature about 
risk and the existence of risk premiums when applied to a futures market. 
Capital market theory hypothesizes that risky investments need higher 
expected returns to compensate for extra risk. Risk is defined in terms 
of the covariance of an asset's return with the market return where large 
covaraiances imply high risk. Only this systematic or market risk will 
be priced by investors in equilibrium. Returns from individual futures 
markets often have large variances which imply large non-systematic or 
individual risk. In theory, however, this risk will not earn a return in 
equilibrium as it can be diversified away. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The usual capital asset pricing model (CAPM) expresses an asset's 
expected return as the sum of a risk-free rate and a risk premium: 
(5.1) Ec(iïi) = . 
R is the risk-free rate, R^ is the return on asset i, Rjjj is the return to 
a market portfolio of all assets, and or beta is the measure of 
systematic risk unique to each asset such that 
The risk (or beta) of each asset's return is proportional to its 
covariance with the return of the market portfolio. Most authors modify 
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equation (5.1) for futures since Pt=0 in equation (1.2').^^ Expressing 
in levels rather than percent yields 
( 5 . 1 0  
and 
( 5 . 2 / )  
^ refers to the actual price of a futures contract and lij^' is the 
customary beta for measuring risk of specific futures markets. 
The CAPM may not apply to futures markets because of inherent zero 
net investment. A positive and significant beta for some asset in 
equation (5.1') implies a positive expected price change. Rational 
sellers would account for that by adjusting the price at which they are 
willing to trade. Conversely, a "short" investment would then have a 
negative beta implying a negative correlation with the market return. 
Short positions would be less risky than purchases since the former could 
be diversified by investments in the market portfolio. Increasing open 
interest^Z means willing new buyers and willing new sellers. Why would 
an agent short a contract of an asset whose price was known to rise on 
average? Could the diversification value of a negative beta be enough to 
offset the adverse price change? This could be possible only if 
^^This follows Black (1976), Scholes (1981) and Cox et al. (1981). 
32open interest is the total number of outstanding contracts of a 
particular commodity at any given time. Each contract has a buyer (a 
long) who promises to deliver the commodity and a seller (a short) who 
promises to accept delivery of the commodity. The number of purchased 
contracts must equal the number of sold contracts. 
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different hedging needs or market forces operate on the long side than on 
the short side of futures. 
Normal Backwardation and Risk Premiums 
An alternative intuition to describe risk in futures markets (or 
another rationale for a positive risk premium) is the theory of "normal 
backwardation," a concept first introduced by Keynes. Keynes theorized 
most hedgers were sellers of commodities. For speculators to accept the 
ownership risk from the hedgers, the former would demand a risk premium 
or a positive expected return. If this occurred, a buy-and-hold strategy 
would produce a small return. Many of the following studies searched for 
evidence of such a risk premium. 
In a study of commodity trader profits, Houthakker (1957) 
concludes that small speculators who take advantage of the risk premium 
and stick to the long side of the market can do well. Dusak (1973) 
conducted an early application of CAPM theory to commodity futures. She 
examined corn, wheat and soybean futures and found no significant 
systematic risk.^^ If B^'=0 in equation (5.1'), the expected price 
change must also equal zero. This fits with intuition regarding zero-sum 
markets since both longs and shorts cannot have positive expected returns 
in an efficient market.Bodie and Rosansky (1980) found returns 
^^She found betas close to zero for all the commodities studied. 
^^The expected return for traders is a return to information. 
Positive expectations on both sides of a transaction would imply that 
some information was not reflected in market price. 
comparable to stocks^^ with a buy-and-hold strategy on a benchmark 
portfolio of commodities from 1950 to 1976 and concluded this was 
evidence of Keynes' risk premium. Their conclusion could also stem from 
an inadvertent yet judicious choice of beginning and ending dates 
considering the huge increase in grain prices during the early 1970s. 
Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983) (CRS) include the Dow Jones 
commodity index equally weighted with the S&P 500 index as the market 
portfolio for their CAPM investigation of commodities. They find a 
systematic risk premium and conclude that normal backwardation has merit. 
In a response, Marcus (1984) suggests the CRS weighting is too heavily on 
commodities since many S&P 500 companies own and deal in commodities. 
When the market portfolio is restructured to what they consider a more 
appropriate one-tenth futures, and nine-tenths Dow, the risk premium 
disappears. Baxter, Conine and Tamarkin (1985) suggest using the Dow 
Jones Commodity Cash Index in conjunction with the S&P 500 index as the 
market barometer. The betas of all the commodities studied were still 
close to zero. With an approach that takes nonstationarity of price 
series into account, So (1987) also finds insignificant betas and small 
systematic risk in wheat, corn and soybean futures. Elam and Vaught 
(1988) find low systematic risk in hog and cattle futures. However, 
Chang, Chen and Chen (1990) study copper, platinum and silver futures and 
find significant betas indicating the existence of systematic risk. 
Hartzmark (1987) studies the normal backwardation theory through 
^^And well in excess of the risk-free rate. 
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actual trading histories of individual futures traders. He finds that 
commercial hedgers on average earn profits while noncommercial 
speculators lose money. If there is a risk premium, the trader who 
accepts the hedger's risk doesn't get it. Opposite conclusions are drawn 
from public records of Commitments of Traders reports of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission by Yoo and Maddala (1991). They find that 
large hedgers consistently lose money and large speculators consistently 
profit, implying that a systematic risk premium is paid by hedgers. 
The Potential for Risk Premiums 
Evidence of risk premiums is the second subject of this research. 
Since returns from a buy-and-hold strategy may provide evidence of a risk 
premium if one exists, this large and diverse group of futures markets 
provide an ideal place to study risk premiums. On each rank date, a buy-
and-hold (BH) portfolio will take a long position in every available 
futures market including spreads. A positive and significant mean return 
to the BH portfolio could be interpreted as evidence for an overall risk 
premium in futures markets. 
However, prices also rise from inflationary influences. So a second 
interpretation of a positive return to the BH portfolio would be 
unexpected inflation. Any systematic inflation component in prices would 
soon be anticipated by agents and prices would not rise on average. Can 
a risk premium be differentiated from unanticipated price inflation? 
Technically, probably not. An intuitive argument follows: as stated 
above, US Treasury bills can be used by traders in place of non-earning 
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margin deposits. If the average nominal return to these Treasury bills 
(Rf) exceeds the average inflation rate (I), then any positive return to 
traders from the BH portfolio (Ry^) would be in addition to the risk-free 
return which is already greater than realized inflation. If we think of a 
risk premium (Rp) as having two components: 
( 5 . 3 )  Rp =  +  {Rf -  I) . 
then Rp is certainly positive if both components are positive. If Elp is 
significantly positive, it is surely greater than a return to unexpected 
inflation. So, if the risk-free rate has averaged above inflation over 
the time period studied^^, any positive and significant mean return to 
the BH portfolio would be evidence of a risk premium. Existence of a 
risk premium would negate market efficiency.The EMH implies that 
once the existence of any systematic return like a risk premium is known, 
agents will arbitrage that opportunity away. The null hypothesis of this 
study will be no risk premium. 
^^See Table B.12 and 
^^This follows since 
return than sell-and-hold 
Chapter VII of the text 
buy-and-hold portfolios 
portfolios. 
would receive a greater 
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CHAPTER VI: EVIDENCE FOR OVERREACTION 
To test the extension of overreactlon from stocks to futures, the 
data was gathered and the methodology was followed as outlined in Chapter 
IV. Previous returns for each futures market and spread portfolio were 
calculated every January and July for holding periods of six, twelve, 
fifteen, eighteen, twenty-four and thirty-six months. Winner and loser 
portfolios were formed with about the top and bottom eighteen percent of 
futures returns respectively (EP). In addition, a second group of winner 
and loser portfolios, each containing all the winners and all the losers 
respectively (AP), were formed to see if the extremes of past returns 
affected future returns differently. In all the tables of Appendix B, 
the series label of extremes has an "E" in the second position; the 
series label representing portfolios of all winners and all losers has an 
"A" in the second position. After portfolio formation, average returns 
were calculated for each portfolio for holding periods of multiples of 
three months from three months to thirty months.Since these were 
paired observations and the number of interest is the difference between 
the mean average portfolio return, a new series was formed, s' and 
statistics were calculated for that series. Statistics from a Student's-
t distribution were used to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
difference, DBAR^^ g, is zero. This is the relevant implication of the 
EMH. 
^®These winner and loser portfolio returns were labeled respectively 
^k,d,s ^k,d,s• 
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Possible statistical dependence when the rank periods overlap was 
noted above in footnote 25. The tables in Appendix B that contain a "b" 
in the table number present results for rank and test periods that do not 
overlap. The RATS Version 3.10 computer software package developed by 
Thomas A. Doan of VAR Econometrics was used for the return calculations 
and statistics; Lotus 1-2-3 Release 3.1 by Lotus Development Corporation 
was used for portfolio formation and manipulation. All the tabular 
results referred to in this section are presented in Appendix B. For all 
of the results presented, the tables contain the series label, the number 
of observations, the mean or DBAR^ g, the standard deviation of the mean 
and the t-statistic that represents the significance level of the 
conclusion that the mean is not zero. A description of the labeling 
system precedes the tables in Appendix B. 
Empirical Results 
Evidence of overreaction would be a DBAR^ g significantly less than 
zero. A DBARj^ g not statistically different from zero would fail to 
reject the combined hypothesis of efficient markets and the martingale 
model. 
Six month rank period 
Table B.l.a shows significantly positive means. The t-statistics for 
test periods of three to twenty-one months are significant at the ten 
percent level and for test periods of six to fifteen months are 
significant at the one percent level. The t-statistics for test periods 
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of twenty-four to thirty months are not statistically different from 
zero. The results are even more striking for the AP, the second group of 
results in Table B.l.a. The t-statistics are higher and only the twenty-
seven and thirty month means are not different from zero. This 
difference in t-statistics is related to the lower standard deviation of 
the series of mean differences for the AP. More contracts are in each 
portfolio so the average portfolio return should be less variable 
possibly resulting in a higher t-statistic if the mean is not too 
different. 
As noted above, overlap of the test and rank periods may cause 
statistical problems. Table B.l.b contains results of series with less 
overlap.39 The same overall trend of significantly positive mean 
differences (MDs) can be noted except in all series labelled DE J2 where 
no means are significant. 
This result is unexpected. Positive test period MDs imply returns 
to the winner portfolios are significantly greater than returns to loser 
portfolios. Winners keep on winning or at least lose less than previous 
losers. There is persistence of returns. The ORH implies significant 
and negative test period mean differences. D&T found significant 
overreaction out to three years in stocks using three year rank returns. 
^^The "J" ("D") suffix on the series label represents portfolios 
formed with a July (January) rank date. Neither series overlaps rank 
periods or test periods of three and six months. The "Jl" ("J2") suffix 
represents portfolios first formed at the end of July, 1964 (1965) and 
every second July afterwards. Similarly, "Dl" (D2") portfolios were 
first formed in January, 1965 (1966) and every second January afterwards. 
The latter four series do not overlap from rank period to eighteen month 
test period. 
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Early expectations for this study were to find overreaction with twelve 
to eighteen month rank periods. 
Twelve month rank period 
While not as striking as the previous results, Tables B.2.a and 
B.2.b show similar return persistence for EPs at short horizons. The 
three month test period t-statistic is significant at the ten percent 
level and the six and nine month ones at five percent. The APs have 
significant mean differences in seven of the eleven test periods with 
three at the one percent level. There are four negative mean difference 
point estimates at longer horizons although none are significant. Table 
B.2.b shows some overreaction emerging at distant horizons. Two of the 
four portfolios ranked every other year, DE J1 and DE D2, have 
significant negative differences at twenty-seven months indicating the 
overreaction result--losers outperforming winners. The latter series 
begins the test period with significant persistence or "underreaction," 
which reverses later. 
Fifteen month rank period 
The trend of less persistence and slightly increasing though 
insignificant overreaction continues during test periods of fifteen month 
rank portfolios. In Table B.3.a, positive MDs are significant at only 
two short horizons. Five MDs have negative though insignificant point 
estimates in later test periods. The APs exhibit similarly decreasing 
persistence although all of the point estimates are positive. Two of the 
four non-overlapped series in Table B.3.b, DE J1 and DE D2, have 
significantly negative MDs for longer holding periods. The other two 
series show continued persistence early in the test period. 
Longer holding periods 
By the eighteen month rank period, all of the significant 
persistence in the full series of MDs has disappeared; all the t-
statistics in Table B.4.a are small except for two in the APs. Only the 
rank period and the first two test period lengths are not overlapping for 
the series in Table B.4.b, so the significantly negative test statistics 
at longer horizons may be suspect. Both the DE J2 and DE D1 series 
exhibit slight early persistence. 
The longer rank periods represented in Tables B.5.a and B.6.a have 
lost all significant persistence and any trace of overreaction for both 
the EPs and the APs. Also, no hints can be gleaned from the subseries in 
Tables B.5.b and B.6.b. For the most part the MDs are small, the 
standard deviations are large and the t-statistics are not significant. 
The overlapping periods could be adding noise to the data precluding 
definitive conclusions, but a more likely scenario has t-statistics 
rejecting too often. Since the latter is not the case here, failure to 
reject efficiency using longer rank periods seems proper. With only 
twenty-eight years of data and a maximum four and one-half year total 
test period, a non-overlapping series has only six observations, too few 
for testing. No other way to generate significant results is available 
within this methodology for this sample. 
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Testing for Robustness 
Three methods were used to test the robustness of the persistence 
result. First, November and May were used as rank months besides July 
and January for rank periods of six and twenty-four months. If the 
persistence had something to do with the crop year or production cycle, 
other rank dates might negate the finding. Second is the outlier 
problem. World sugar had the third highest unconditional variance, was 
present in the EPs far more often than other commodities and seemed to be 
have the most persistent moves. For example, 80.4% of the extreme 
portfolios contained sugar contracts with several consecutive rank dates 
in one or the other. The same methodology was followed with sugar 
removed from the sample to be sure its persistence and variance were not 
driving the result. Since one possible objection to this study is the 
inclusion of spread portfolios, the third test for robustness removes 
them from the sample. Spreads are simply linear combinations of other 
sample observations, so their addition may be redundant and could be 
driving the persistence result. Forming extreme portfolios without 
spreads will check for that possibility. 
Other rank dates and sugar 
The results of using November and May as rank dates with rank 
periods of six and twenty-four months are in Tables B.7.a, B.7.b, B.8.a, 
and B.S.b. Comparing the t-statistics in Table B.7.a with those in Table 
B.l.a shows some reductions. Significant persistence in Table B.l.a 
continues through the twenty-one month holding period but ends after 
fifteen months in Table B.7.a. The MDs are mostly smaller in Table B.7.a 
explaining the reduced t-statistics. Comparing results in Tables B.l.b 
and B.7.b show similar small differences. Two main differences are 
exhibited in the latter. Persistence is more evident in the once per 
year rank date series, DE J and DE D, but less evident in the bi-yearly 
series. DE J1 shows strong overreaction at longer horizons not extant 
in other series. 
Results for rank dates May and November for a twenty-four month 
holding period in Tables B.8.a and B.S.b are very similar to those for 
rank dates July and January. Neither persistence nor overreaction shows 
itself in any of the findings and efficiency cannot be rejected. In 
general, the persistence finding is robust to changes of rank date. 
Removing world sugar from the sample of futures contracts studied 
produces little change in the results. The longer horizon MDs are much 
smaller without sugar which is expected considering its high volatility. 
But the standard deviation is similarly reduced so the t-statistics 
remain essentially unchanged. Except for smaller MDs and standard 
deviations, Table B.9.b results are very comparable to Table B.l.b so the 
persistence result is still verified and is robust to removal of at least 
one outlier. 
Removal of spread portfolios 
Spread portfolios are a combination of two or three futures 
contracts and so are less volatile than individual contracts. So 
variances for the EPs formed without spreads would likely be higher than 
with them and Tables B.lO.a, B.lO.b and B.ll reflect this difference. 
For the six month rank period results in Tables B.lO.a and B.lO.b, no 
change in conclusions is warranted. MDs of Table B.lO.a are comparable 
with earlier results but, as noted, standard deviations of portfolio MDs 
are larger so the t-statistics are slightly smaller. Persistence is 
evident, too, in the series in Table B.lO.b. 
The greater volatility of MDs without spread portfolios created a 
small difficulty; during one fifteen month rank period, all futures 
contracts were winners so the loser portfolio was empty. The test 
strategy utilizing paired observations was changed and the t-statistic 
was calculated using pooled standard deviations. This combination of 
much larger variances and smaller MDs resulted in insignificant t-
statistics, so no persistence or overreaction is observed in Table B.ll. 
Overall, the persistence result is robust to these three changes in 
strategy. Portfolios of winners formed by past returns from six or 
twelve month holding periods continue to outperform comparably created 
portfolios of losers at horizons of up to fifteen months. Point 
estimates of longer horizon MDs do turn negative indicating some evidence 
of overreaction, but are statistically significant in only a few cases. 
Figures C.l, C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C offer a more graphic 
representation of the persistence result and its decay with longer rank 
periods. They depict the mean (solid line) and a 90% and 98% confidence 
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interval (CI)^® about the mean for all the return horizons. Figure C.l 
shows the 90% CI to be completely positive for the first seven test 
horizons. The 98% CI is also completely positive for holding periods two 
through six so the persistence result is very significant. Figures C.2 
and C.3 depict continued persistence but at decaying significance. 
Distant horizons in Figure C.3 show some evidence of the overreaction 
phenomenon but neither CI becomes completely negative at any horizon. 
Measuring Portfolio Risk 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the biggest challenge to proper 
interpretation of these findings is measuring the risk of winner and 
loser portfolios. If the former continues to outperform the latter 
because previously winning contracts are inherently riskier, the 
persistence finding is appropriate. Capital market theory predicts that 
risky assets will have high expected returns to reward holders of those 
assets for bearing risk. Return risk has customarily been associated 
with the variance of returns, such that higher variance implies greater 
risk.41 A complete approach to risk measurement would look at the 
conditional portfolio variance as estimated by the sample variance of 
daily returns for some weeks or months prior to formation of each 
"^^A (1-a) 100% confidence interval for mean n using sample mean u is 
< M < 
2 yn z </n 
^^The third and fourth moments of the return distribution are 
probably also related to risk but that has not been researched very 
completely. 
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portfolio. If the return performance was directly related to prior 
volatility, the persistence result would be expected. Daily returns were 
not available for this study. 
The strategy of choosing only contracts with extreme past returns 
may accentuate the risk problem; this observation is the basis for the 
simple manner in which risk is measured here. If the distribution of 
returns is skewed to the right as many analysts believe and if a risk 
premium is paid to holders of volatile contracts, risky futures contracts 
would be found more often in winner than in loser portfolios. Just 
counting the number of times each contract shows up in winner and loser 
portfolios could indicate the extent of this particular problem. 
Counting winners and losers 
Tables B.13, B.14 and B.15 present the results of this analysis. 
Each contract was counted in one of four portfolios: extreme winner, 
extreme loser, other winner or other loser. Many contracts have 
different beginning trading dates so percentages of total observations 
were used rather than raw counts. Tables B.13 and B.15 list the 
percentages and standard deviations for individual commodities^^ from 
portfolios formed with a six and twelve month rank period 
^^The table results are sorted in order decreasing percentage of 
times spent in either extreme portfolio--times in winner plus times in 
loser divided by total observations. 
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respectively.43 It is not immediately evident from the tables that the 
more variable futures are in either the winner or loser category more 
than the other. It is very evident, though, from cursory inspection that 
highly variable futures are more often in the extreme portfolios than 
not. 
Table B.14 offers additional perspective. To obtain some measure of 
the relation between variance and percentage in specific portfolios, 
regressions were run with a constant and the standard deviation of each 
future as the independent variables and four different dependent 
variables: percentage of times in either extreme category, in winner 
portfolio, in loser portfolio, and in either winner category. R-square 
is the statistic of interest. In the six month rank period regression 
shown in Table B.14, 55.5% of the variance in the percentage in an 
extreme portfolio is explained by the unconditional standard deviation of 
the individual commodity. This is expected-- the more widely dispersed 
the returns the more times the returns will be extreme. From the second 
and third regressions, almost twice as much variance in extreme winner 
percentage as extreme loser percentage is explained by standard 
deviation. So, highly volatile contracts are more likely to be losers 
than winners. The last regression further verifies that standard 
deviation is related to extreme returns and not to whether the returns 
are winners or losers. Similar, though not as striking results are 
4^In Table B.15, the first ten futures in order are sugar, Winnipeg 
rye, unleaded gas, Winnipeg oats, palladium, crude oil, coffee, orange 
juice, soybean oil, and pork bellies. 
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presented In the lower half of Table B.14 for portfolios formed from a 
twelve month rank period. 
While this simple analysis does not offer a detailed picture of 
portfolio risk, it shows that winner portfolios are probably not grossly 
more risky than loser portfolios. Granted this, returns from the two 
portfolios can be compared and the persistence result holds. 
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CHAPTER VII: EVIDENCE FOR RISK PREMIUMS 
Along with the data calculations of earlier chapters, a fifth 
portfolio was formed. This buy-and-hold portfolio (BHP) includes both 
long positions of every futures contract and one unit of each spread 
portfolio. As noted in Chapter V, any significant returns to these 
holdings could be evidence of that elusive risk premium in futures 
markets. Using the definition in Equation (4.1), returns could be 
significantly greater or less than one. Either positive or negative 
returns would suffice. If the return was positive (negative) and 
significant, long traders (short traders) would earn the premium. From 
Keynes, longs are customarily thought to receive the return to risk but 
the theory is the same if the reverse happens. For either to occur, the 
futures market would be inefficient. If a systematic return exists 
anywhere, efficiency demands that agent arbitrage eliminates that 
possibility. If longs receive a systematic risk premium as Keynes 
suspected, rational sellers would account for that by a higher 
reservation price. Table B.17 contains four sets of grand total return 
statistics to the BHPs. All of the returns except for the three month 
test period are significantly greater than one. For example, the mean of 
series GRNB6 in the second group^^ is 1.0517. If this sample is 
^^Series GRNB6 in the second group is the rank period return for a 
holding period of one year. This particular series covers almost all of 
the whole sample. The other grand total series include slightly 
different parts of the whole sample but essentially they all measure the 
same thing. 
representative, on average the return from investing one dollar in the 
BHP would be 5.17 cents per year or a 5.17% return. This return to the 
BHP is also robust to the three different strategies described in Chapter 
VI. Table B.17 contains BHP returns with spread positions and sugar 
excluded from the sample to test for robustness. The GRN12 series mean 
return is positive and significant at the five percent level for both 
groups. The mean of series GRN12 with no spreads is 1.0762 or a 7.62% 
return for each dollar invested which is higher, but not significantly, 
than the mean of similar series with spreads. 
The question posed in Chapter V remains: how can this BHP return be 
called a risk premium and be differentiated from unexpected inflation? 
Table B.12 lists one measure of low risk interest rates and one measure 
of inflation.^5 a trader who deposits US Treasury bills with the 
futures exchange to cover his margin will earn the risk-free rate in 
addition to the return on the BHP. With Shiller's average low-risk rate 
substantially above the average inflation rate, the extra return of the 
BHP is much above and beyond total inflation and so should certainly be 
greater than unexpected inflation. The definition of return used in this 
study should exclude all expected inflation. Successive period prices 
^^The second column contains inflation returns comparable to the BHP 
returns using the Consumer Price Index (1983-100). The returns are 
CPI^+l/CPI^. The nominal interest rate series (1.0 + the interest rate) 
is from Shiller (1989) and is the total return to investing in prime 
commercial paper. The original source is the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
The mean interest return is 1.0814 (or 8.14%) and the mean inflation 
return over the same time period is 1.0566 (or 5.66%). This 2.48% 
difference should be more than enough to account for the difference 
between prime commercial paper and US Treasury rates. 
?! t g and Pi,c+l,s both prices of futures i for delivery in period 
s. If inflation is expected, it will be built equally into both prices 
and Equation (4.1) will eliminate it from the return.^ 6 
Figures C.4 and C.5 from Appendix C depict the risk premium and CI 
graphically. In Figure C.4, the 98% CI is completely above one at the 
twelve month test return horizon and beyond. The 90% CI moves above one 
at the six month horizon. Figure C.5 shows the returns to BHF formed 
with no spread portfolios. The CIs become all positive quicker since the 
BHF mean return point estimates without spreads are higher than those 
with spread positions. 
^^The return will include any change in inflation expectations from 
period t to t+1 but that is what unexpected inflation means. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Major Goals and Findings 
This study had several goals. The first was to assemble a large 
historical database of daily and/or monthly futures prices in a wide and 
diverse group of markets back twenty-five or thirty years. Several 
different sources had to be used to accomplish this. A second goal 
required researching the broad literature of market efficiency for a 
reference list of the major works dealing with efficiency theory and 
market anomalies. 
The first major empirical goal was to examine this new database for 
evidence of overreaction by extending the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
strategy. Selection bias would not be a problem in this environment, nor 
would data mining be a problem as this database has not been studied as 
extensively as has stock market data. 
Gathering evidence of potential risk premiums was the second 
empirical goal. Since positive risk premiums are very difficult to 
differentiate from unexpected inflation, a simple-minded but effective 
check on test results is to be sure the database used for the examination 
includes later periods of commodity deflation in addition to the well-
known periods of inflation. The current database accomplishes that by 
sampling the commodity deflationary 1980s as well as the huge price rises 
of grain, metals and livestock in the 1970s. 
A final goal is to extend other research in market efficiency to 
this database. This will be discussed more fully in the last section. 
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Persistence 
Persistence in returns was the first phenomenon uncovered by this 
study. Portfolios of previous extreme winners outperform portfolios of 
extreme losers many months after the ranking date. In addition, 
portfolios of all previous winners continue to outperform all losers up 
to two years after ranking. Finally, while ranking periods of up to 
three years were used to form portfolios, no significant overreaction was 
identified. Some point estimates of MDs of distant return horizons were 
negative but significance levels could not reject zero MDs. Apparently, 
DeBondt and Thaler's finding of overreaction does not extend to futures 
markets. The joint hypothesis of market efficiency and the martingale 
model is still rejected by the persistence finding at medium horizons. 
However, the null hypothesis was market efficiency, so ORH was not 
rejected but was unsubstantiated. The persistence at shorter horizons in 
no way precludes an additional finding of overreaction at longer 
horizons. In fact there was some distinct evidence for it but it was not 
overwhelming. 
First order evidence trends toward efficiency. Average returns to 
portfolios in the rank period were very significantly different from 
one.47 MDs for the rank period ranged from 0.49 for a three month 
holding period to 1.27 for thirty-six months. The largest test period 
MDs were not much over 0.10--almost an order of magnitude difference. 
^^See Table B.16. The longer the rank period, the greater (smaller) 
the mean return of the extreme winner (loser) portfolio. 
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Risk premium 
The risk premium finding was the second major result of this study. 
It is very clear that a positive and significant return ranging from five 
to seven percent per year accrues to a buy-and-hold portfolio. While the 
unexpected inflation interpretation of this return is economically valid, 
the unique zero investment feature of futures markets points to a risk 
premium conclusion. Some suggestions to differentiate between the two 
will be made in the paper's final section. 
Explanations for Phenomena 
What kind of economic interpretation can be placed on the 
observation that winner portfolios continues to outperform loser 
portfolios at medium horizons? Ultimately, the ORH is still one 
explanation. Non-rational overweighting of recent information when agent 
probability distributions are updated could cause the observed short term 
persistence as well as DeBondt and Thaler's overreaction when the trend 
finally changes. While some evidence of overreaction was found, it was 
not pervasive enough to verify its presence. But this failure to observe 
overreaction does not reject it. Other established methods of financial 
research could be employed to examine the potential for negative serial 
correlation which is necessary for overreaction. Many market traders 
believe prices follow trends and this study has provided evidence for 
that belief. 
A second interpretation for the persistence concerns how agents 
reflect information into asset prices. Some information is highly 
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complex with ramifications that are not obvious and consequences that 
take a long time to unfold. In reality, market agents have different 
abilities and may be unwilling or unable to adjust prices to account for 
those consequences and prices would be slow to reflect them. Models of 
asymmetric information may be appropriate in this context. 
Unequal risk for the winner and loser portfolios is a third possible 
explanation. Return is a reward for risk and if winner portfolios are 
more risky than losers, expected returns would be higher. While it was 
shown that highly volatile contracts are not on average more often in the 
winner portfolio, this study needs to be extended with more detailed 
examination of risk. At a minimum, conditional variances should be 
contrasted with test period returns. Perhaps variances would fall into 
ARCH or GARCH model categories. 
There are two interpretations for the positive returns to the BH 
portfolio: inflation and risk premium. The final section presents some 
ideas to distinguish between them. 
Limitations of this Research 
There are several areas of potential problems with this study. Four 
of the areas have been discussed thoroughly above and will be briefly 
alluded to here. Whether futures contracts are really assets is one 
concern. The real question is whether futures prices behave like asset 
prices and most research has answered yes. A more difficult problem is 
the splicing of series of monthly contract prices together. Each 
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different contract of one commodity represents different assets.^8 
Storage costs and production expectations may add noise to the spliced 
series. There is no alternative to splicing for this kind of long term 
study, but it may obscure the real evidence. Similarly, the results of 
the empirical work may be built in the data by the series splicing or by 
the way the study was constructed. 
Measurement of portfolio risk is a third concern. As mentioned 
above, the proper risk analysis would look at conditional variances at 
the date of portfolio formation. If there is a correlation between these 
conditional variances and test period returns then a reward for risk may 
be a factor in the persistence of positive returns. A fourth factor is 
the inability to differentiate between a positive risk premium and 
unexpected inflation. Both interpretations of the BH portfolio return 
are plausible. 
Another potential pitfall is the inclusion of spread portfolios and 
how they are calculated. It could be argued they are redundant since all 
the underlying series are included. Several research papers have dealt 
exclusively with spreads, so the idea is not new. The relative price of 
two related commodities is the information added by the spreads. A 
positive aspect to spreads is their counter to inflation; being long and 
short related commodities inflation effects would not be noticed. 
Transaction costs are not a part of this research. Following Jensen 
(1978) , markets are efficient if there is no arbitrage return above 
^®They may differ in delivery time, crop year and production cycle. 
62 
transaction costs. It is not known whether the persistence return or the 
risk premium is greater than economic costs of trading. 
The last problem is part of the series splicing objection but from a 
different angle. Each time the splice occurs, real agents would have to 
sell one contract and buy another. Every time a transaction takes place 
there may be a liquidity risk--a risk of not being able to enter or exit 
the market. The two observed returns may be a response to this risk. 
Directions for Future Research 
There are two categories for potential research projects. The first 
sorts through the above questions to determine the validity of the 
objection and, if valid, refines the strategy to deal with it. The 
second applies other research methods to this database thereby extending 
those papers. 
Refining the stratepv 
Transaction costs could be calculated and deducted from observed 
returns to see if the same findings obtain. If only contracts in which a 
very large trade volume and open interest are used, liquidity risk should 
not be a factor. If spreads positions are a concern, the entire project 
could be done without the spread portfolios and with only the spread 
positions. 
Fourth, using this strategy with cash price series should avoid the 
splicing pitfalls and allow some differentiation between inflation and 
risk premium. Cash prices do not jump from contract to contract, do not 
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have lirait moves and do not have volume and open interest problems. 
Could there be overreaction or underreaction in cash prices? Another way 
to distinguish inflation from risk premium is to divide the series top to 
bottom. Follow the same methodology with series from January, 1964 to 
January, 1981 and series from February 1981 to the present. The former 
contained huge price rises in grains, metals and livestock. The latter 
was more of a deflationary time. If the risk premium surfaced in both of 
these subseries, the inflation interpretation could be discarded. 
Other areas of research 
It would be very interesting to look at long horizon returns in the 
same manner as Fama and French (1988) to test directly for negative 
serial correlation rather than indirectly as in this study. Another 
method with a similar end is variance ratio testing as in Poterba and 
Summers (1988). Other research methods in the finance literature could 
be applied to this database. 
Futures contracts could be separated into groups and examined for 
overreaction within the groups. Grains, currencies, metals, meats, index 
futures, petroleum products, interest rate futures, and soft or food 
commodities are possible categories. 
The biggest potential research area which crosses both of these 
categories is risk--definition, measurement and application. Most past 
examinations of risk have focused on the CAPM definition, where the only 
risk priced in equilibrium is market risk defined as correlation with the 
market return which cannot be diversified away. If markets are not 
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strictly efficient, risk must be redefined. Risk is defined differently 
in continuous time models which may have application here. The Black-
Scholes option pricing model is very widely used by financial traders and 
practitioners. Noise trader models show that the risk of price diverging 
from fundamental value is priced in equilibrium. Risk analysis in new 
directions offers vast potential for future research. 
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APPENDIX A: 
LIST OF FUTURES, SPREADS AND FUTURES EXCHANGES 
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Table A.l. List of futures contracts and exchanges 
Futures Beginning Ending 
# Code contract date date Exchange 
1 CZ Corn Jan-64 CBOT 
2 CT Cotton Jun-67 NYCTE 
3 02 Oats Jan-64 CBOT 
4 SM Soybean meal Jan-64 CBOT 
5 SO Soybean oil Jan-64 CBOT 
6 SZ Soybeans Jan-64 CBOT 
7 WZ Wheat-Chicago Jan-64 CBOT 
8 KW Wheat-Kansas City Mar-76 KCBT 
9 MW Wheat-Minnesota Jul-70 MGE 
10 WB Barley-Winnipeg Nov-80 WCE 
11 WF Flaxseed-Winnipeg Nov-80 WCE 
12 RS Rapeseed-Winnipeg Oct-80 WCE 
13 WR Rye-Winnipeg Nov-80 WCE 
14 WW Wheat-Winnipeg Nov-80 WCE 
15 wo Oats-Winnipeg Nov-80 WCE 
16 FC Feeder cattle Oct-72 CME 
17 LC Live cattle Nov-69 CME 
18 LH Live hogs Jan-69 CME 
19 PB Pork Bellies Jan-64 CME 
20 BL Broilers Oct-68 Dec-78 CBOT 
21 HG Copper Jan-64 COMEX 
22 GC Gold Jan-75 COMEX 
23 PA Paladium Jan-77 NYMEX 
24 PL Platinum Mar-68 NYMEX 
25 SI Silver Jan-64 COMEX 
26 CD Canadian dollar Apr-76 IMM 
27 BP British pound Mar-75 IMM 
28 DM German mark Nov-74 IMM 
29 JY Japanese yen Feb-77 IMM 
30 SF Swiss franc Oct-74 IMM 
31 CC Cocoa Jan-64 CSCE 
32 KC Coffee Aug-73 CSCE 
33 LB Lumber Aug-70 CME 
34 JO Orange juice Feb-67 NYCTE 
35 SB Sugar-world Jan-64 CSCE 
36 SE Shell eggs Jan-64 Nov-79 CME 
37 ED Eurodollar time deposit Feb-82 IMM 
38 TB T-bills: 90 day Jan-76 IMM 
39 TY T-notes: 10 year May-82 CBOT 
40 FY T-notes: 5 year May-88 CBOT 
41 US T-bonds: 30 year Sep-77 CBOT 
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Table A.l. continued 
Futures Beginning Ending 
# Code contract date date Exchange 
42 CL Crude oil Apr-83 NYMEX 
43 HO Heating oil Nov-79 NYMEX 
44 HU Unleaded gasoline Jan-85 NYMEX 
45 CR CRB index Aug-86 NYFE 
46 MB Muni-bond index May-85 CBOT 
47 SP S&P 500 index Apr-82 lOM-CME 
48 DX US dollar index Nov-85 FINEX 
49 YX NYSE composite index Apr-82 NYFE 
50 KV Value-line index Feb-82 KCBT 
51 GN Ginnie Mae interest Feb-76 Dec - 86 CBOT 
52 PW Plywood Jan-70 Jun-84 CBOT 
53 NR Rough rice Aug-86 CRCE 
Table A.2. Description of spread portfolios 
Spread Beginning 
# Code description date 
54 GCSI Gold-silver Feb-75 
55 CZSZ Corn-soybeans Jan-64 
56 CZWZ Corn-wheat Jan-64 
57 SZCT Soybeans-cotton Jun-67 
58 LHPB Live hogs-pork bellies Feb-69 
59 LCLH Live cattle-live hogs Feb-69 
60 CZLC Corn-live cattle Nov-64 
61 CZFC Corn-feeder cattle Oct-72 
62 CZLH Corn-live hogs Feb-69 
63 FCCZLC Cattle feeding margin Oct-72 
64 SZSMSO Soybean crush margin Jan-64 
65 TBED T-bill-Eurodollar rate Feb-82 
66 TBUS Term structure of rates Sep-77 
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Table A.3. List of all futures exchanges 
Name 
Code of exchange 
CBOT Chicago Board of Trade 
CME Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
CRCE Chicago Rice & Cotton Exchange 
CSCE Coffee, Sugar, & Cocoa Exchange 
COMEX Commodity Exchange, Inc. 
FINEX Financial Instrument Exchange 
lOM Index & Option Market 
IMM International Monetary Market 
KCBT Kansas City Board of Trade 
MGE Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
NYCTE New York Cotton Exchange 
NYFE New York Futures Exchange, Inc. 
NYMEX New York Mercantile Exchange 
WCE Winnipeg Commodity Exchange 
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APPENDIX B; 
TABLES OF RESULTS 
81 
This appendix contains all the tables for the research. This page 
provides a list of all the series names and a description of the labelling 
system. 
"D" at the label beginning refers to "difference" between winner and 
loser means. "E" in second position refers to "extreme" portfolios. "A" 
in second position refers to portfolios of "all" the futures. "B6" at the 
end refers to the rank period or "before" ranking. This can refer to any 
length rank period. The "Z" at the end is a filler and is meaningless. 
The "3" or "6" or ... refer to months and is the test holding period 
length. The "J", "D", "Jl", "J2", "Dl", and "D2" suffixes are explained 
in footnote thirty-nine on page forty-four. 
For Tables B.16 and B.17, the only difference is the prefix. These 
are not differences, but are the actual means. "EX" refers to "extreme" 
portfolios. "AL" refers to portfolios of "all" futures contracts. The 
"GRN" prefix refers to means of buy-and-hold portfolios. 
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Table B, .1. a. Statistics for a six month rank period 
Series # Ob s a Mean Stnd dvn^ T--stat^ 
DEB6 56 0, ,49132 0.21419 17 .166*** 
DE3Z 56 0, 24634E. •01 0 .10973 1 .6800* 
DE6Z 55 0, 70911E. •01 0 .16267 3 .2330*** 
DE9Z 55 0. ,10058 0 ,19151 3 .8949*** 
DE12 54 0. 13250 0, ,28403 3, 4280*** 
DE15 54 0. ,10540 0 ,26710 2 .8997*** 
DE18 53 0. 10026 0. 32034 2, .2785** 
DE21 53 0. 10034 0, ,42589 1 ,7152* 
DE24 52 0. 47791E-•01 0, ,49695 0 .69348 
DE27 52 -0. 18309E-01 0, ,63133 -0, 20913 
DE30 51 -0. 40111E-01 0, ,65760 -0, 43560 
DAB6 56 0. 26015 0, ,14171 13, 738*** 
DA3Z 56 0. 32264E-01 0. ,11415 2, 1152** 
DA6Z 55 0. 63655E-01 0. 14392 3, 2802*** 
DA9Z 55 0. 80363E-01 0. 13508 4, ,4122*** 
DAI 2 54 0. 98588E-01 0. 19068 3, 7995*** 
DAI 5 54 0. 81166E-01 0. 19148 3, , 1149*** 
DAIS 53 0. 85676E-01 0. 22884 2, 7256*** 
DA21 53 0. 87741E-01 0. 25517 2, 5033** 
DA24 52 0. 62784E-01 0. 26343 1. 7186* 
DA27 52 0. 20282E-01 0. 27000 0. ,54168 
DA30 51 0. 26411E-01 0. 28703 0. 65712 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.l.b. Statistics for a six month rank period 
Series // Obs& Mean Stnd dvn^ T-stat^ 
DEB6J 28 0 .46002 0 .22605 10.768*** 
DE3ZJ 28 0 .33325E-•01 0 .10481 1 .6825* 
DE6ZJ 28 0.55502E-•01 0 .17722 1 .6572 
DE9ZJ 28 0 .64820E-•01 0 .19072 1 .7984* 
DE12J 27 0.86131E-•01 0 .24732 1 .8096* 
DE15J 27 0 ,66813E-•01 0 .24921 1 .3931 
DE18J 27 0.32740E-•01 0 .26059 0 .65284 
DE21J 27 -0, 53372E-02 0 .35515 -0 . 78088E-
DE24J 26 -0, 87647E-01 0.53162 -0 .84067 
DE27J 26 -0, 14450 0, ,82294 -0, 89537 
DE30J 26 -0, 15554 0, ,83789 -0, .94657 
DEB6D 28 0, ,52263 0, ,20080 13, ,772*** 
DE3ZD 28 0. 15943E-01 0, ,11569 0. ,72920 
DE6ZD 27 0. 86891E-01 0. ,14772 3, 0565*** 
DE9ZD 27 0. 13767 0, ,18867 3, 7913*** 
DE12D 27 0, 17886 0, ,31435 2, 9566*** 
DE15D 27 0. 14399 0. 28326 2. ,6414** 
DE18D 26 0. 17038 0. 36441 2. ,3841** 
DE21D 26 0. 21009 0. 47065 2, 2761** 
DE24D 26 0. 18323 0. 42782 2. ,1839** 
DE27D 26 0. 10789 0. 32054 1. 7162* 
DE30D 25 0. 79938E-01 0. 37437 1. 0677 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.l.b. continued 
Series // Obs& Mean Stnd dvn'' T-sCatC 
DEB6J1 14 0 .43995 0 .14453 11 .390*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 0 .71189E -01 0 .99340E-•01 2 .6813*** 
DE6ZJ1 14 0 .97059E -01 0 .16500 2 .2010** 
DE9ZJ1 14 0 .99155E -01 0 .22877 1 .6217 
DE12J1 14 0 .99392E -01 0 .24726 1 .5040 
DE15J1 14 0 .53446E -01 0 .22927 0 .87223 
DE18J1 14 0 .40404E -01 0 .28178 0 .53651 
DE21J1 14 -0 .21749E -01 0 .42400 -0 .19193 
DE24J1 13 -0 .15753 0 .67326 -0 .84362 
DE27J1 13 -0 .28950 1 .1128 -0 .93803 
DE30J1 13 -0.27247 1 .0950 -0 .89719 
DEB6J2 14 0 .48008 0 .29047 6 .1841*** 
DE3ZJ2 14 -0 .45386E. -02 0 .99284E-01 -0 .17104 
DE6ZJ2 14 0 .13945E -01 0 .18516 0 .28180 
DE9ZJ2 14 0 .30484E. -01 0 .14377 0 .79338 
DE12J2 13 0 .71850E-•01 0 .25665 1, .0094 
DE15J2 13 0 .81208E-•01 0, 27782 1, .0539 
DE18J2 13 0 .24485E-•01 0 ,24691 0 .35755 
DE21J2 13 0 .12337E-•01 0 .27908 0, .15938 
DE24J2 13 -0, 17765E-•01 0, 35344 -0, 18123 
DE27J2 13 0, ,48936E-•03 0, .35651 0, ,49491E-( 
DE30J2 13 -0, 38614E-•01 0, ,48372 -0, 28782 
DEB6D1 14 0. 50058 0, 16921 11, 069*** 
DE3ZD1 14 0. 16337E-•01 0. 11974 0. 51050 
DE6ZD1 14 0. 91690E-•01 0, 15979 2, , 1470** 
DE9ZD1 14 0. 99632E-•01 0. 21209 1. 7577* 
DE12D1 14 0. 18463 0. 39792 1. 7361* 
DE15D1 14 0. 15803 0. 32898 1. 7974* 
DE18D1 13 0. 20775 0. 44697 1. 6758 
DE21D1 13 0. 30136 0. 59732 1. 8190* 
DE24D1 13 0. 23227 0.49239 1. 7008* 
DE27D1 13 0. 13221 0. 31302 1. 5229 
DE30D1 13 0. 17182 0. 35793 1. 7308* 
DEB6D2 14 0. 54467 0. 23252 8. 7647*** 
DE3ZD2 14 0. 15549E-01 0. 11602 0. 50145 
DE6ZD2 13 0. 81722E-01 0. 13986 2. 1068** 
DE9ZD2 13 0. 17862 0. 15778 4. 0818*** 
DE12D2 13 0. 17264 0. 20610 3. 0203*** 
DE15D2 13 0. 12886 0. 23689 1. 9613* 
DE18D2 13 0. 13301 0. 27175 1. 7649* 
DE21D2 13 0. 11882 0. 29434 1. 4555 
DE24D2 13 0. 13419 0. 36557 1. 3235 
DE27D2 13 0. 83563E-01 0. 33880 0. 88929 
DE30D2 12 -0. 19604E-01 0. 38109 -0. 17820 
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Table B.2.a. Statistics for a twelve month rank period 
Series # Obs a Mean Stnd dvn"^ T-! stat^ 
DEB6 55 0 .76925 0 .38265 14 .909*** 
DE3Z 55 0 .31075E-01 0 .13452 1 .7131* 
DE6Z 54 0 .66926E-01 0 .19021 2 .5856** 
DE9Z 54 0 .61569E-01 0 .19205 2 .3559** 
DE12 53 0 .49638E-01 0 .22971 1 .5732 
DE15 53 0 .32305E-01 0 .26996 0 .87118 
DE18 52 0 .13076E-01 0 .30797 0 .30617 
DE21 52 -0 .10855E-01 0 .31225 -0 .25068 
DE24 51 -0, .54780E-01 0, ,38193 -1 .0243 
DE27 51 -0, 42646E-01 0, ,38106 -0 .79922 
DE30 50 -0, 36727E-01 0, ,39653 -0 .65493 
DAB6 55 0, ,38478 0. ,16977 16 .808*** 
DA3Z 55 0, 18476E-01 0. ,58875E-01 2 .3273** 
DA6Z 54 0. 45607E-01 0. 92964E-01 3, 5051*** 
DA9Z 54 0. 51371E-01 0. 11426 3, 3037*** 
DAI 2 53 0. 61358E-01 0. 15676 2, 8495*** 
DAI 5 53 0. 53798E-01 0. 17574 2, 2286** 
DA18 52 0. 56069E-01 0. 20199 2, 0017* 
DA21 52 0. 49025E-01 0. 19226 1. ,8388* 
DA24 51 0. 44567E-01 0. 21537 1, ,4778 
DA27 51 0. 31077E-01 0. 20698 1, ,0722 
DA30 50 0. 35110E-01 0. 23071 1. 0761 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
•^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.2.b. Statistics for a twelve month rank period 
Series # Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn° T--stat^ 
DEB6J 28 0 .75577 0 .33152 12 .063*** 
DE3ZJ 28 0 .14859E' •01 0 .12830 0 .61283 
DE6ZJ 27 0 .63960E--01 0 .16223 2, .0487* 
DE9ZJ 27 0 .78119E-•01 0 .21596 1 .8796* 
DE12J 27 0 .59715E-•01 0 .24622 1, 2602 
DE15J 27 0 .19187E-•01 0 .28649 0 .34800 
DE18J 26 -0 .19159E-•02 0 .33435 -0, 29218E-i 
DE21J 26 0 .10795E-•02 0, ,34742 0, , 15844E- I  
DE24J 26 -0 .23872E-•01 0, ,37710 -0, 32279 
DE27J 26 -0 ,54342E-•02 0, ,37583 -0, ,73728E-i 
DE30J 25 -0 .35327E-•01 0 ,39082 -0, 45196 
DEB6D 27 0, ,78323 0.43540 9, 3471*** 
DE3ZD 27 0, ,47891E-•01 0. ,14112 1, 7634* 
DE6ZD 27 0. ,69892E-01 0. 21774 1. 6679* 
DE9ZD 27 0, ,45019E-01 0, 16726 1. 3986 
DE12D 26 0. 39174E. 01 0. 21559 0. 92652 
DE15D 26 0. 45928E-01 0. 25662 0. 91259 
DE18D 26 0. 28068E-01 0. 28501 0. 50214 
DE21D 26 -0. 22789E-01 0. 27912 -0. 41632 
DE24D 25 -0. 86925E-01 0. 39199 -1. 1088 
DE27D 25 -0. 81347E-01 0. 39030 -1, 0421 
DE30D 25 -0. 38127E-01 0. 41022 -0. 46471 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level, 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.2.b. continued 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn"^ T -stat° 
DEB6J1 14 0 .73628 0 .22921 12 .019*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 0 .10851E -01 0 .15109 0 .26872 
DE6ZJ1 14 0 .49455E -01 0 .19193 0.96414 
DE9ZJ1 14 0 .10488E -01 0 .21423 0 .18317 
DE12J1 14 0 .13592E -01 0 .25715 0 .19776 
DE15J1 14 -0 .47055E -01 0 .31696 -0 .55548 
DE18J1 13 -0 .91956E -01 0 .38789 -0 .85474 
DE21J1 13 -0 .90887E -01 0.40261 -0 .81393 
DE24J1 13 -0 .15024 0 .40678 -1 .3317 
DE27J1 13 -0 .16071 0 .35767 -1 .6201 
DE30J1 13 -0 .13613 0 .40785 -1 .2034 
DEB6J2 14 0 .77526 0.41821 6 .9361*** 
DE3ZJ2 14 0 .18867E -01 0 .10643 0 .66330 
DE6ZJ2 13 0 .79580E •01 0 .12886 2 ,2266** 
DE9ZJ2 13 0 .15095 0 .20062 2 .7130*** 
DE12J2 13 0 .10939 0 .23359 1 ,6884* 
DE15J2 13 0 .90524E--01 0 ,24158 1, 3511 
DE18J2 13 0 .88124E-•01 0 .25469 1, 2475 
DE21J2 13 0 .93046E-•01 0 ,26653 1, 2587 
DE2AJ2 13 0, 10250 0. ,31014 1, ,1916 
DE27J2 13 0 ,14984 0, ,33778 1, 5995 
DE3ÛJ2 12 0, ,73876E-•01 0, ,35604 0, ,71879 
DEB6D1 14 0, ,80484 0, 52890 5, 6938*** 
DE3ZD1 14 -0, 17631E-•01 0, 13982 -0. 47182 
DE6ZD1 14 0, 28768E-•01 0. ,24937 0. 43165 
DE9ZD1 14 0. 32849E-•01 0. 15301 0. 80326 
DE12D1 13 0. 29807E-01 0. 22952 0. 46823 
DE15D1 13 0. 56479E-•01 0. 28718 0. 70911 
DE18D1 13 0. 10406E-01 0. 29913 0. 12543 
DE21D1 13 -0. 84143E-02 0. 33751 -0. 89889E-( 
DE24D1 13 -0. 15516E-01 0. 44714 -0. 12511 
DE27D1 13 0. 40698E-01 0. 41225 0. 35594 
DE30D1 13 0. 10940 0. 40410 0. 97609 
DEB6D2 13 0. 75996 0. 32646 8. 3932*** 
DE3ZD2 13 0. 11845 0. 10755 3. 9709*** 
DE6ZD2 13 0. 11418 0. 17681 2. 3284** 
DE9ZD2 13 0. 58124E-01 0. 18679 1. 1219 
DE12D2 13 0. 48541E-01 0. 20966 0. 83474 
DE15D2 13 0. 35378E-01 0. 23342 0. 54646 
DE18D2 13 0. 45729E-01 0. 28121 0. 58632 
DE21D2 13 -0. 37164E-01 0. 21897 -0. 61193 
DE24D2 12 -0. 16429 0. 32340 -1. 7597* 
DE27D2 12 -0. 21356 0. 33209 -2. 2277** 
DE30D2 12 -0. 19794 0. 36802 -1. 8632* 
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Table B.3.a. Statistics for a fifteen month rank period 
Series # Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn^ T-stat^ 
DEB6 54 0 .90864 0 .49442 13 . 505*** 
DE3Z 54 0 .11078E-•01 0 .10833 0 .75147 
DE6Z 53 0 .45901E-•01 0 .16123 2 .0726* 
DE9Z 53 0, .59296E-•01 0 .19326 2 .2337** 
DE12 52 0.54812E-•01 0 .27555 1 .4344 
DE15 52 0, ,97401E-•02 0 .22743 0 .30883 
DE18 51 -0, ,11666E-•01 0 .24917 -0 .33434 
DE21 51 -0, 20904E-•01 0, ,24002 -0 .62197 
DE24 50 -0. 39022E-•01 0, ,29025 -0, 95065 
DE27 50 -0, ,65136E-•01 0, ,32264 -1, .4275 
DE30 49 -0.49088E-•01 0, ,36570 -0, .93961 
DAB6 54 0. 45427 0. 20428 16, ,341*** 
DA3Z 54 0. 69091E-02 0. 59921E-01 0, ,84730 
DA6Z 53 0. 29475E-01 0. 91678E-01 2. ,3406** 
DA9Z 53 0. 32693E-01 0. 11380 2, 0915* 
DAI 2 52 0. 41191E-01 0. 15823 1, 8773* 
DAI 5 52 0. 25068E-01 0. 16755 1. 0789 
DAIS 51 0. 27561E-01 0. 17958 1. 0961 
DA21 51 0. 20590E-01 0. 15940 0. 92250 
DA24 50 0. 30627E-01 0. 22375 0. 96786 
DA27 50 0. 26318E-01 0. 26837 0. 69343 
DA30 49 0. 26635E-01 0. 26683 0. 69875 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
•^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Signifleant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.3.b. Statistics for a fifteen month rank period 
Series # Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn" T -stat^ 
DEB6J 27 0 .89805 0 .53334 8 .7494*** 
DE3ZJ 27 0 .19352E-•01 0 .11034 0 .91132 
DE6ZJ 27 0.43613E-•01 0 .19442 1 .1656 
DE9ZJ 27 0 .33062E-•01 0 .21204 0 .81018 
DE12J 26 0 .41679E-•01 0 .33916 0 .62661 
DE15J 26 0 .97361E-•03 0 .25993 0, ,19099E-i 
DE18J 26 -0 .21113E-•01 0 ,25531 -0, 42166 
DE21J 26 -0 .62019E-•01 0, ,22502 -1, 4054 
DE24J 25 -0 .86326E-•01 0, ,27620 -1, 5627 
DE27J 25 -0 .11275 0, ,26578 -2, 1211** 
DE30J 25 -0 .85827E-
I—
1 O
 0, ,30648 -1, 4002 
DEB6D 27 0 ,91923 0, ,46220 10, . 334*** 
DE3ZD 27 0, ,28037E-02 0, ,10772 0, ,13525 
DE6ZD 26 0, ,48276E-01 0, ,12143 2, 0271* 
DE9ZD 26 0, 86540E-01 0, ,17150 2, 5731** 
DE12D 26 0, 67945E-01 0. 19875 1. ,7432* 
DE15D 26 0, ,18507E-01 0, , 19440 0, ,48542 
DE18D 25 -0, 18403E-02 0, ,24749 -0, ,37180E-( 
DE21D 25 0. 21855E-01 0. 25208 0. ,43350 
DE24D 25 0. 82808E-02 0. 30175 0. ,13721 
DE27D 25 -0. 17521E-01 0. 37036 -0. 23653 
DE30D 24 -0. 10817E-01 0. 42200 -0. 12557 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
•^Significant at the .10 level. 
•**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
Table B.3.b. continued 
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Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn° T -stat*^ 
DEB6J1 14 0 .87215 0 .53016 6 .1553*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 -0 .31245E -01 0 .10114 -1 .1560 
DE6ZJ1 14 0 .25456E -02 0 .19663 0 .48441E- I  
DE9ZJ1 14 -0 .86986E -02 0 .11308 -0 .28784 
DE12J1 13 -0 .32394E -01 0 .18254 -0 .63985 
DE15J1 13 -0 .53439E -01 0 .21436 -0 .89885 
DE18J1 13 -0 .10332 0 .16383 -2 .2740** 
DE21J1 13 -0 .11739 0 .16400 -2 .5808** 
DE24J1 13 -0 .11327 0 .19719 -2 ,0711** 
DE27J1 13 -0 .81711E -01 0 .21472 -1 .3721 
DE30J1 13 -0 .28167E--01 0 .29340 -0 .34514 
DEB6J2 13 0 .92595 0 .55695 5 .9944*** 
DE3ZJ2 13 0 .73841E-•01 0 .95369E-01 2 .7917*** 
DE6ZJ2 13 0 .87840E-•01 0 .18954 1 .6710* 
DE9ZJ2 13 0 .78034E--01 0 .28168 0 .99886 
DE12J2 13 0 .11575 0 .44095 0 .94649 
DE15J2 13 0 .55386E-•01 0 .29732 0 .67167 
DE18J2 13 0 .61098E-•01 0 .30711 0, 71730 
DE21J2 13 -0, .66522E-•02 0, ,26823 -0, 89419E-( 
DE24J2 12 -0 .57138E-•01 0 .34963 -0. 56612 
DE27J2 12 -0 .14638 0. ,31852 -1, 5920 
DE30J2 12 -0, 14829 0, 32070 -1, 6018 
DEB6D1 14 0, ,92800 0, ,51061 6, ,8002*** 
DE3ZD1 14 0, ,22833E-•01 0. ,10186 0. ,83869 
DE6ZD1 13 0, 83633E-•01 0. 13023 2. 3154** 
DE9ZD1 13 0, ,18071 0. ,15565 4, 1861*** 
DE12D1 13 0. 13489 0. 19596 2, 4820** 
DE15D1 13 0. 90250E-01 0, 19937 1. 6321 
DE18D1 13 0. 10081 0. 26780 1. 3573 
DE21D1 13 0. 11458 0. 24607 1. 6788* 
DE24D1 13 0. 11777 0. 29886 1. 4209 
DE27D1 13 0. 85265E-01 0. 36628 0. 83932 
DE30D1 12 0. 25641E-01 0. 36019 0. 24660 
DEB6D2 13 0. 90978 0. 42453 7. 7268*** 
DE3ZD2 13 -0. 18766E-01 0. 11370 -0. 59509 
DE6ZD2 13 0. 12919E-01 0. 10513 0. 44310 
DE9ZD2 13 -0. 76320E-02 0. 13353 -0. 20608 
DE12D2 13 0. 99634E-03 0. 18489 0. 19430E-( 
DE15D2 13 -0.53237E-01 0. 16683 -1. 1506 
DE18D2 12 -0. 11304 0. 17163 -2. 2817** 
DE21D2 12 -0. 78591E-01 0. 22676 -1. 2006 
DE24D2 12 -0. 11034 0. 26779 -1. 4273 
DE27D2 12 -0. 12887 0. 35624 -1. 2532 
DE30D2 12 -0. 47275E-01 0. 48961 -0. 33448 
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Table B.4.a. Statistics for an eighteen month rank period 
Series # Obs& Mean Stnd dvn'^ T-stat*^ 
DEB6 54 1 .0401 0 .62421 12 .244*** 
DE3Z 54 0 .11414E-•01 0 .10177 0 .82415 
DE6Z 53 0 .23368E--01 0 .15010 1 .1334 
DE9Z 53 0 .21911E-•01 0 .17222 0 .92624 
DE12 52 0 .80522E-•02 0 .20601 0 .28221 
DE15 52 -0 .12814E-•01 0 .20152 -0 .45852 
DE18 51 -0, .35293E-•01 0 .24605 -1, .0244 
DE21 51 -0, 15023E-01 0. 24854 -0, .43167 
DE24 50 -0, 16616E-01 0. ,31904 -0, 36828 
DE27 50 -0, 44257E-•01 0, ,35880 -0, 87221 
DE30 49 0, ,28199E-•02 0. ,44012 0, ,44851E 
DAB6 54 0. 50885 0, ,24413 15, 317*** 
DA3Z 54 0. 77697E-02 0. 57563E-01 0, 99187 
DA6Z 53 0. 26144E-01 0. 87295E. 01 2, 1804** 
DA9Z 53 0. 24851E-01 0. 10410 1, 7379* 
DAI 2 52 0. 28137E-01 0. 13546 1. 4979 
DAI 5 52 0. 18292E-01 0. 16002 0. 82431 
DA18 51 0. 13548E-01 0. 17718 0. 54606 
DA21 51 0.77228E-02 0. 16934 0. 32569 
DA24 50 0. 18851E-01 0. 22366 0. 59600 
DA27 50 0. 70504E-02 0. 21035 0. 23700 
DA30 49 0. 30119E-01 0. 28345 0. 74381 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
•*Significant at the .10 level. 
^^Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.4.b. Statistics for an eighteen month rank period 
Series // Obs& Mean Stnd dvn° T-•stat^ 
DEB6J 27 1.0068 0 .66751 7, 8375*** 
DE3ZJ 27 0 .20536E -01 0 .10438 1, 0223 
DEéZJ 27 0 .17998E--01 0 .16881 0, ,55400 
DE9ZJ 27 -0 .41687E' •02 0 .15213 -0, 14238 
DE12J 26 -0 .26231E-•01 0 .20584 -0. 64978 
DE15J 26 -0 .22700E-•01 0 .22015 -0, 52577 
DE18J 26 -0 .46013E-•01 0 .26387 -0. 88917 
DE21J 26 -0 .35625E-•01 0, 26551 -0. 68417 
DE24J 25 -0 .52736E-•01 0 .35646 -0. 73972 
DE27J 25 -0 .75341E-•01 0, .38648 -0. 97470 
DE30J 25 -0, 12476E-•01 0. ,43312 -0. 14403 
DEB6D 27 1, ,0733 0, ,58856 9. 4761*** 
DE3ZD 27 0, ,22926E-02 0, ,10023 0. 11886 
DE6ZD 26 0, 28944E-01 0, ,13101 1. 1265 
DE9ZD 26 0.48994E-01 0. 19006 1. 3144 
DE12D 26 0, ,42356E-01 0. ,20435 1. 0569 
DE15D 26 -0. 29280E-02 0. 18487 -0. 80757E-01 
DE18D 25 -0. 24143E-01 0. 23096 -0. 52268 
DE21D 25 0. 64029E-02 0. 23307 0. 13736 
DE24D 25 0. 19503E-01 0. 27934 0. 34910 
DE27D 25 -0. 13174E-01 0. 33385 -0. 19730 
DE30D 24 0. 18754E-01 0. 45605 0. 20146 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B .4. a. continued 
Series # Obs® Mean Stnd dvn^ T -stac^ 
DEB6J1 14 0.96737 0 .58017 6 .2388*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 -0.26370E-01 0 .92227E-•01 -1 .0698 
DE6ZJ1 14 0.22367E-02 0 .17500 0 .47822E-01 
DE9ZJ1 14 -0.12539E-01 0 .93652E--01 -0 .50097 
DE12J1 13 -0.32101E-01 0 .19531 -0 .59262 
DE15J1 13 -0.22198E-01 0 .23748 -0 .33702 
DE18J1 13 -0.49540E-01 0 .23202 -0 .76985 
DE21J1 13 -0.28485E-01 0 .26990 -0 .38053 
DE24J1 13 0.50332E-01 0 .34226 0 .53022 
DE27J1 13 0.72323E-01 0 .27804 0 .93787 
DE30J1 13 0.13384 0 .42058 1 .1474 
DEB6J2 13 1.0493 0 .77264 4 .8965*** 
DE3ZJ2 13 0.71049E-01 0 .95193E-•01 2 .6910*** 
DE6ZJ2 13 0.34972E-01 0 .16723 0 .75403 
DE9ZJ2 13 0.48454E-02 0 .20118 0 .B6840E-01 
DE12J2 13 -0.20361E-01 0 .22373 -0 .32814 
DE15J2 13 -0.23202E-01 0, .21112 -0 .39625 
DE18J2 13 -0.42486E-01 0, .30198 -0 .50727 
DE21J2 13 -0.42765E-01 0, ,27187 -0, .56716 
DE2AJ2 12 -0.16439 0, .35112 -1 .6219 
DE27J2 12 -0.23531 0, ,43344 -1, .8806* 
DE30J2 12 -0.17099 0. ,40450 -1, 4644 
DEB6D1 14 1.0893 0. 73811 5, 5217*** 
DE3ZD1 14 0.31460E-01 0. 84643E-01 1, ,3907 
DE6ZD1 13 0.63406E-01 0, 14983 1, 5258 
DE9ZD1 13 0.13191 0. 21050 2. ,2594** 
DE12D1 13 0.10258 0. 20797 1, 7784* 
DE15D1 13 0.70589E-01 0. 19541 1. 3024 
DE18D1 13 0.78463E-01 0. 25497 1. 1096 
DE21D1 13 0.96957E-01 0. 24349 1. 4357 
DE24D1 13 0.12366 0. 29411 1. 5160 
DE27D1 13 0.76521E-01 0. 34472 0. 80038 
DE30D1 12 0.85077E-01 0. 43083 0. 68406 
DEB6D2 13 1.0562 0. 39963 9. 5290*** 
DE3ZD2 13 -0.29118E-01 0. 10928 -0. 96071 
DE6ZD2 13 -0.55184E-02 0. 10362 -0. 19201 
DE9ZD2 13 -0.33924E-01 0. 12669 -0. 96546 
DE12D2 13 -0.17867E-01 0. 18944 -0. 34005 
DE15D2 13 -0.76445E-01 0. 14598 -1. 8882* 
DE18D2 12 -0.13530 0. 13979 -3. 3529*** 
DE21D2 12 -0.91697E-01 0. 18343 -1. 7317* 
DE24D2 12 -0.93338E-01 0. 22173 -1. 4582 
DE27D2 12 -0.11034 0. 30616 -1. 2485 
DE30D2 12 -0.47570E-01 0. 48954 -0. 33662 
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Table B.5.a. Statistics for a twenty-four month rank 
period 
Series y/ Obs* Mean Stnd dvn" r-statC 
DEB6 53 1.2392 0 .83221 10.840*** 
DE3Z 53 0.82947E-03 0 .11803 0 .51164E-o: 
DE6Z 52 0.213562-01 0 .18195 0 .84638 
DE9Z 52 0.11878E-01 0 .19122 0 .44793 
DE12 51 0.60781E-02 0 .24115 0 .18000 
DE15 51 -0.21341E-01 0 .24435 -0 .62369 
DE18 50 -0.14850E-01 0 ,28363 -0 .37023 
DE21 50 -0.34628E-01 0 .30341 -0 .80700 
DE24 49 0.20010E-02 0, ,38867 0 .36038E-o; 
DE27 49 0.17321E-01 0, .40230 0 .30138 
DE30 48 0.73394E-01 0, ,56100 0, 90641 
DAB6 53 0.60973 0, ,31122 14, 263*** 
DA3Z 53 0.10545E-01 0, 57254E-01 1, 3408 
DA6Z 52 0.21879E-01 0. 89024E-01 1, 7722* 
DA9Z 52 0.21475E-01 0, 11556 1, 3401 
DAI 2 51 0.21658E-01 0. 15153 1, ,0207 
DAI 5 51 0.16737E-01 0. 15794 0, ,75680 
DAI 8 50 0.22472E-01 0. 21477 0, ,73987 
DA21 50 0.13632E-01 0. 19818 0, ,48638 
DA24 49 0.36065E-01 0. 29424 0, 85798 
DA27 49 0.38249E-01 0. 33502 0. 79920 
DA30 48 0.50538E-01 0. 38440 0. 91087 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.5.b. Statistics for a twenty-four month rank 
period 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn^ T--stat^ 
DEB6J 27 1 .2156 0 .74719 8 .4533*** 
DE3ZJ 27 -0 .82133E-•02 0 .13174 -0 .32395 
DE6ZJ 26 0 .19230E-•01 0 .15252 0, .64290 
DE9ZJ 26 0 .32762E-•01 0 .17683 0 ,94472 
DE12J 26 0 .22802E-•01 0 .21283 0, 54630 
DE15J 26 -0 .89659E-•02 0 .22879 -0, 19982 
DE18J 25 -0 .21355E-•02 0 .29680 -0. , 35976E-I 
DE21J 25 -0 .19989E-•01 0 .31023 -0, 32217 
DE24J 25 0 .20621E-01 0 .41355 0, ,24931 
DE27J 25 0 .13632E-•01 0 ,33774 0, ,20180 
DE30J 24 0, ,91395E-01 0. ,59254 0. ,75563 
DEB6D 26 1, 2638 0, ,92666 6, 9539*** 
DE3ZD 26 0. ,10220E-01 0. ,10365 0. 50276 
DE6ZD 26 0, 23483E-01 0, ,21040 0. 56911 
DE9ZD 26 -0, 90070E-02 0, ,20595 -0. 22301 
DE12D 25 -0. 11315E-01 0. 27084 -0. 20888 
DE15D 25 -0. 34211E-01 0, 26369 -0. 64870 
DE18D 25 -0. 27565E-01 0. 27535 -0. 50056 
DE21D 25 -0. 49266E-01 0. 30210 -0. 81539 
DE24D 24 -0. 17394E-01 0. 36884 -0. 23104 
DE27D 24 0. 21164E-01 0. 46766 0. 22170 
DE30D 24 0. 55393E-01 0. 53975 0. 50277 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
•^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.5.b. continued 
Series # Obs& Mean Stnd dvn° T -stat*^ 
DEB6J1 14 1 .1806 0 .68723 6 .4277*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 0 .76353E -02 0 .11889 0 .24031 
DE6ZJ1 13 0 .39263E -01 0 .15617 0 .90648 
DE9ZJ1 13 0 .86035E -01 0 .17559 1 .7667 
DE12J1 13 0 .49965E -01 0 .21756 0 .82807 
DE15J1 13 0 .43645E -01 0 .25737 0 .61143 
DE18J1 13 0 .10429 0 .31880 1 .1795 
DE21J1 13 0 .11788 0 .29466 1 .4424 
DE24J1 13 0 .17058 0 .44940 1 .3686 
DE27J1 13 0 .88812E 
1—1 O
 0 .30971 1 .0339 
DE30J1 12 0 .20808 0 .66669 1 .0812 
DEB6J2 13 1 .2532 0 .83369 5 .4201*** 
DE3ZJ2 13 -0 .25281E -01 0 .14726 -0 .61900 
DE6ZJ2 13 -0 .80391E -03 0 .15232 -0 .19029E-01 
DE9ZJ2 13 -0 .20510E -01 0 .16782 -0 .44064 
DE12J2 13 -0 .43616E-•02 0 ,21315 -0, .73779E-01 
DE15J2 13 -0 .61577E •01 0 .19188 -1, 1571 
DE18J2 12 -0 .11743 0 ,23116 -1, 7598* 
DE21J2 12 -0 .16935 0 ,26165 -2 ,2421** 
DE24J2 12 -0, 14184 0, ,31218 -1, 5739 
DE27J2 12 -0, ,67814E-•01 0, ,36101 -0, 65072 
DE30J2 12 -0, ,25287E-•01 0, ,50986 -0. ,17180 
DEB6D1 13 1, ,3276 1, ,1696 4, ,0928*** 
DE3ZD1 13 0, ,56674E-•01 0. 10174 2. 0086* 
DE6ZD1 13 0. 30443E-•01 0. 20581 0. 53333 
DE9ZD1 13 0. 23313E-01 0. 27100 0, 31018 
DE12D1 13 0. 55381E-01 0. 30901 0, 64620 
DE15D1 13 0. 28516E-•01 0. 27595 0. 37258 
DE18D1 13 0. 27262E-•01 0. 28178 0. 34883 
DE21D1 13 -0. 34179E-01 0. 32368 -0. 38073 
DE24D1 12 -0. 50324E-01 0. 37714 -0. 46224 
DE27D1 12 0. 61649E-02 0. 60554 0. 35268E-01 
DE30D1 12 -0. 12309E-02 0. 57220 -0. 74520E-02 
DEB6D2 13 1. 1999 0. 64206 6. 7381*** 
DE3ZD2 13 -0. 36234E-01 0. 85774E-01 -1. 5231 
DE6ZD2 13 0. 16522E-01 0. 22307 0. 26705 
DE9ZD2 13 -0. 41327E-01 0. 11251 -1. 3244 
DE12D2 12 -0. 83569E-01 0. 21197 -1. 3657 
DE15D2 12 -0. 10216 0. 24279 -1. 4577 
DE18D2 12 -0. 86961E-01 0. 26720 -1. 1274 
DE21D2 12 -0. 65610E-01 0. 29029 -0. 78293 
DE24D2 12 0. 15535E-01 0. 37397 0. 14390 
DE27D2 12 0. 36163E-01 0. 30020 0. 41729 
DE30D2 12 0. 11202 0. 52416 0. 74031 
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Table B.6.a. Statistics for a thirty-six month rank 
period 
Series // Obs* Mean Stnd dvn° r-stat^ 
DEB6 51 1 .2659 1, 1563 7 .8182*** 
DE3Z 51 0 .54099E-•02 0, ,97307E-01 0 .39703 
DE6Z 50 0 .33331E-•01 0, ,15656 1 .5054 
DE9Z 50 0 .36244E-•01 0, ,20500 1 .2502 
DE12 49 0 .62194E-•01 0, ,30148 1 .4441 
DE15 49 0 .64765E-•01 0, ,30175 1 .5024 
DE18 48 0 .64043E-•01 0. 41219 1 .0765 
DE21 48 0 .85122E-•01 0, 44780 1 .3170 
DE24 47 0 .11236 0. 63995 1 .2037 
DE27 47 0, ,15733 0. 79503 1 .3567 
DE30 46 0, ,19101 0. 79831 1 .6228 
DAB6 51 0, .77589 0. 39249 14 .117*** 
DA3Z 51 0, 59822E-•02 0. 64368E-01 0 .66371 
DA6Z 50 0, 17248E-01 0. 88527E-01 1, 3777 
DA9Z 50 0, ,11256E-01 0. 11506 0 .69174 
DAI 2 49 0, 20915E-01 0. 16542 0, 88504 
DAI5 49 0. 21053E-02 0. 16336 0, 90215E-01 
DAI 8 48 0. 16872E-01 0. 22946 0, ,50943 
DA21 48 0. 14148E-01 0. 22324 0, ,43908 
DA24 47 0. 29796E-01 0. 28933 0, ,70600 
DA27 47 0. 24177E-01 0. 31202 0, ,53121 
DA30 46 0. 34742E-01 0. 33428 0, 70488 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.6.b. Statistics for a thirty-six month rank 
period 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn° T' -stat^ 
DEB6J 26 1 .2461 1 .0612 5 .9876*** 
DE3ZJ 26 -0 .47668E-•02 0 .10186 -0 .23863 
DE6ZJ 25 0.14013E-•01 0 .15526 0 .45129 
DE9ZJ 25 0 .15013E-•01 0 .18966 0 .39580 
DE12J 25 0 .27315E-•01 0 .22474 0 .60771 
DE15J 25 0 .28665E-•01 0 .22779 0 .62921 
DE18J 24 0 .47473E-01 0 ,34116 0, .68170 
DE21J 24 0, ,48698E-01 0, ,42614 0, ,55983 
DE24J 24 0 ,35402E-01 0 ,44833 0, .38685 
DE27J 24 0, ,78629E-01 0, ,34415 1, 1193 
DE30J 23 0, ,14250 0, ,61435 1, 1125 
DEB6D 25 1. 2865 1. 2695 5, 0668 
DE3ZD 25 0. ,15994E-01 0. 93225E-01 0, ,85780 
DE6ZD 25 0. 52650E-01 0. 15863 1, 6595 
DE9ZD 25 0. 57475E-01 0. 22111 1. ,2997 
DE12D 24 0. 98526E-01 0. 36645 1. 3172 
DE15D 24 0. 10237 0. 36468 1. 3752 
DE18D 24 0. 80613E-01 0. 47982 0. 82306 
DE21D 24 0. 12155 0. 47477 1. 2542 
DE24D 23 0. 19266 0. 79559 1. 1614 
DE27D 23 0. 23946 1. 0881 1. 0554 
DE30D 23 0. 23951 0. 95981 1. 1967 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
^^Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
Table B.6.b. continued 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn*^ T -stat^ 
DEB6J1 13 1 .2544 1 .1769 3 .8432*** 
DE3ZJ1 13 -0 .14989E -01 0 .11771 -0 .45909 
DE6ZJ1 13 0 .17884E -01 0 .16856 0 .38253 
DE9ZJ1 13 -0 .19261E -01 0 .14809 -0.46895 
DE12J1 13 0 .23491E -01 0 .23222 0 .36474 
DE15J1 13 0 .30774E -01 0 .23730 0 .46757 
DE18J1 12 0 .21312E -01 0 .37603 0 .19633 
DE21J1 12 0 .91690E--01 0 .57146 0 .55580 
DE2AJ1 12 0 .71870E -01 0 .48206 0 .51646 
DE27J1 12 0 .46370E--01 0 .25725 0 .62440 
DE30J1 12 0 .67601E-•01 0 .26132 0 .89611 
DEB6J2 13 1 .2378 0 .98022 4 .5529*** 
DE3ZJ2 13 0 .54549E' •02 0 .86777E-•01 0 .22665 
DE5ZJ2 12 0 .98201E-•02 0 .14683 0 ,23169 
DE9ZJ2 12 0 .52143E-•01 0 .22730 0 ,79468 
DE12J2 12 0 .31457E-•01 0 .22656 0 ,48098 
DE15J2 12 0 .26381E-•01 0 .22752 0 ,40167 
DE18J2 12 0 .73633E-•01 0 ,31696 0. 80476 
DE21J2 12 0, .57055E-•02 0, ,22160 0, 89191E-01 
DE24J2 12 -0 .10659E-•02 0.43009 -0.85849E-02 
DE27J2 12 0, ,11089 0, ,42332 0, ,90742 
DE30J2 11 0, ,22422 0, 86089 0, 86381 
DEB6D1 13 1, ,2999 1. ,2331 3, 8009 
DE3ZD1 13 -0. , 18640E-01 0. 88976E-01 -0. 75535 
DE6ZD1 13 0, 52695E-01 0, 17096 1. 1113 
DE9ZD1 13 0, 43215E. 01 0. 13748 1. 1334 
DE12D1 12 0. 47030E-01 0. 22881 0. 71202 
DE15D1 12 0. 11309 0. 39135 1. 0011 
DE18D1 12 0. 81241E-01 0. 32306 0. 87113 
DE21D1 12 0. 52504E-01 0. 23038 0. 78949 
DE24D1 12 0. 81073E-01 0. 28975 0. 96926 
DE27D1 12 0. 52838E-01 0. 31210 0. 58648 
DE30D1 12 0. 81775E-01 0. 24694 1. 1472 
DEB6D2 12 1. 2719 1. 3628 3. 2331 
DE3ZD2 12 0. 53513E-01 0. 85861E-01 2. 1590 
DE6ZD2 12 0. 52601E-01 0. 15172 1. 2010 
DE9ZD2 12 0. 72923E-01 0. 29249 0. 86367 
DE12D2 12 0. 15002 0. 47185 1. 1014 
DE15D2 12 0.91541E-01 0. 35309 0. 89908 
DE18D2 12 0. 79985E-01 0. 61401 0.45125 
DE21D2 12 0. 19059 0. 63861 1. 0338 
DE24D2 11 0. 31440 1. 1265 0. 92567 
DE27D2 11 0. 44304 1. 5525 0. 94647 
DE30D2 11 0. 41158 1. 3774 0. 99104 
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Table B.7.a. Statistics for a six month rank period 
using November and May 
Series // Obs^ Mean Stnd~dvn^ T-stat° 
DEB6 55 0 .49009 0 .19366 18 .768*** 
DE3Z 55 0 .46367E-•01 0 .11608 2 .9624*** 
DE6Z 54 0 .52383E-•01 0 .13400 2 .8726*** 
DE9Z 54 0 .10075 0 .19700 3 .7582*** 
DE12 53 0 .85467E-•01 0 .22777 2 .7318*** 
DE15 53 0 .85931E-•01 0 .28778 2 .1738** 
DE18 52 0 .68742E-•01 0, .31466 1 .5754 
DE21 52 0 .42015E-•01 0 .32435 0 .93409 
DE24 51 0 .68028E-•02 0, .34126 0 .14236 
DE27 51 0, ,19335E-•01 0, ,37255 0, ,37065 
DE30 50 0 ,60066E-•01 0, ,48067 0, .88362 
DAB6 55 0, ,24500 0, ,87062E-01 20, 870*** 
DA3Z 55 0, 31590E-01 0, 69095E-01 3, 3907*** 
DA6Z 54 0, ,41187E-01 0, 76562E-01 3, 9532*** 
DA9Z 54 0. 81780E-01 0. 12626 4, ,7596*** 
DAI 2 53 0. 75562E-01 0. 16181 3. 3997*** 
DAI 5 53 0. 75805E-01 0. 20427 2. 7017*** 
DAIS 52 0. 69444E-01 0. 23705 2. 1125** 
DA21 52 0. 66876E-01 0. 27750 1. 7378* 
DA24 51 0. 27551E-01 0. 36577 0. 53790 
DA27 51 0. 57052E-01 0. 31043 1. 3125 
DA30 50 0. 66484E-01 0. 27682 1. 6983* 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
^^Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.7.b. Statistics for a six month rank period 
using November and May 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn° T' -stat^ 
DEB6J 28 0 .49047 0 .16385 15 .840*** 
DE3ZJ 28 0 .58128E--01 0 .13309 2 .3110** 
DE6ZJ 27 0 .55531E-•01 0 .13536 2 .1316** 
DE9ZJ 27 0 .10236 0 .18016 2 .9524*** 
DE12J 27 0 .73969E-•01 0 .20710 1, .8559* 
DE15J 27 0.39662E-•01 0 ,25615 0, 80457 
DE18J 26 0 .42098E-•02 0 ,30431 0 .70540E-01 
DE21J 26 -0 .38183E-01 0.33632 -0, 57889 
DE24J 26 -0 .68558E-•01 0, ,37699 -0, 92729 
DE27J 26 -0, 63196E-01 0.39830 -0, 80903 
DE30J 25 -0, 62128E-01 0, ,42305 -0, 73429 
DEB6D 27 0, ,48969 0, 22364 11. ,378*** 
DE3ZD 27 0, ,34171E-01 0, 96362E-01 1, 8426* 
DE6ZD 27 0, ,49235E-01 0. 13513 1, 8932* 
DE9ZD 27 0. 99147E-01 0. 21599 2. ,3852** 
DE12D 26 0. 97408E-01 0. 25102 1. 9787* 
DE15D 26 0. 13398 0. 31514 2. 1678** 
DE18D 26 0. 13327 0. 31736 2. 1413** 
DE21D 26 0. 12221 0. 29685 2. 0992** 
DE24D 25 0. 85178E-01 0. 28639 1. 4871 
DE27D 25 0. 10517 0. 32992 1. 5939 
DE30D 25 0. 18226 0. 51150 1. 7816* 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
•^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.7.b. continued 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn° T -stat^ 
DEB6J1 14 0 .52951 0 .18248 10 .858*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 0 .59012E -02 0 .10101 0 .21859 
DE6ZJ1 14 0 .77156E -02 0.13754 0 .20989 
DE9ZJ1 14 0 .37719E -01 0 .20613 0 .68468 
DE12J1 14 -0 .19822E -01 0 .20123 -0 .36857 
DE15J1 14 -0 .54069E -01 0 .23398 -0 .86463 
DE18J1 13 -0 .10753 0 .30868 -1 .2560 
DE21J1 13 -0 .18299 0 .32621 -2 .0226** 
DE24J1 13 -0 .25033 0 .35652 -2 .5316** 
DE27J1 13 -0 .25195 0 .32155 -2 .8252*** 
DE30J1 13 -0 .25488 0 .27117 •3 .3889*** 
DEB6J2 14 0 .45143 0 .13849 12 .196*** 
DE3ZJ2 14 0 .11035 0 .14392 2 .8691*** 
DE6ZJ2 13 0 .10703 0 .11691 3 .3008*** 
DE9ZJ2 13 0 .17198 0 .11903 5 .2094*** 
DE12J2 13 0 .17498 0 .16656 3 .7878*** 
DE15J2 13 0 .14060 0 .24812 2, .0432** 
DE18J2 13 G .11595 0 .26569 1 .5735 
DE21J2 13 0 .10663 0 .28949 1, .3280 
DE24J2 13 0. 11321 0.31208 1, .3080 
DE27J2 13 0, .12556 0, ,38720 1, 1692 
DE30J2 12 0, .14668 0 ,46775 1, 0863 
DEB6D1 14 0, ,50380 0, ,23738 7. ,9410*** 
DE3ZD1 14 0, ,43012E-•01 0, ,11016 1, 4610 
DE6ZD1 14 0. 56109E. •01 0. ,12279 1, 7097* 
DE9ZD1 14 0. 12496 0, 24147 1. 9363* 
DE12D1 13 0. 11483 0. 19217 2. 1545** 
DE15D1 13 0. 15404 0. 28014 1. 9825* 
DE18D1 13 0. 17805 0. 32387 1. 9823* 
DE21D1 13 0. 13509 0. 29154 1. 6707 
DE24D1 13 0. 99448E-01 0. 25652 1. 3978 
DE27D1 13 0. 10823 0. 26980 1. 4463 
DE30D1 13 0. 13228 0. 29131 1. 6372 
DEB6D2 13 0. 47450 0. 21643 7. 9049*** 
DE3ZD2 13 0. 24650E-01 0. 82364E-01 1. 0791 
DE6ZD2 13 0. 41832E-01 0. 15204 0.99205 
DE9ZD2 13 0. 71350E-01 0. 19053 1. 3502 
DE12D2 13 0. 79986E-01 0. 30608 0. 94223 
DE15D2 13 0. 11392 0. 35714 1. 1501 
DE18D2 13 0. 88495E-01 0. 31716 1. 0060 
DE21D2 13 0. 10934 0. 31342 1. 2578 
DE24D2 12 0. 69719E-01 0. 32660 0. 73948 
DE27D2 12 0. 10186 0. 39756 0. 88753 
DE30D2 12 0.23641 0. 68711 1. 1919 
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Table B.8.a. Statistics for a twenty-four month rank 
period with May and November 
Series # Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn° T-stat° 
DEB6 52 1, 2209 0 .79698 11 .047*** 
DE3Z 52 0 .26414E--01 0 ,12067 1 .5785 
DE6Z 51 0, ,17324E-•01 0 .17819 0 .69429 
DE9Z 51 0, ,29743E-•01 0 .20719 1.0252 
DE12 50 -0. ,14488E-•02 0 .22930 -0 .44677E-01 
DE15 50 0, ,14822E-•01 0 .31292 0 .33493 
DE18 49 0. 23543E. •01 0, .40986 0 .40209 
DE21 49 0. 96063E-•02 0, .39313 0 .17105 
DE24 48 0. 31363E-•01 0, .57512 0 .37781 
DE27 48 0.46014E-•01 0.49028 0 .65022 
DE30 47 0. 73080E-01 0, ,60763 0 .82453 
DAB 6 52 0. 58134 0. 30119 13, 919*** 
DA3Z 52 0. 11929E-01 0. 10790 0 .79723 
DA6Z 51 • 0. 37422E-02 0. 11348 -0, .23551 
DA9Z 51 0. 14648E-01 0. 14060 0 .74398 
DAI 2 50 0. 17071E-02 0. 17318 0, ,69702E-01 
DAI 5 50 • 0. 36667E-02 0. 20190 -0, 12842 
DAI 8 49 0. 60065E-03 0. 22744 0, ,18487E-01 
DA21 49 0. 15187E-01 0. 23782 0, ,44703 
DA24 48 0. 54095E-02 0. 23277 0, ,16101 
DA27 48 0. 29774E-01 0. 32031 0. , 64400 
DA30 47 0. 56882E-01 0. 41112 0, 94854 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
CT-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
^••Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.8.b. Statistics for a twenty-four month rank 
period with May and November 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn" T -stat^ 
DEB6J 26 1 .1657 0 .56944 10 .439*** 
DE3ZJ 26 0 .35089E--01 0 .10568 1 .6931* 
DE6ZJ 26 0 .49659E-•01 0 .17380 1 .4569 
DE9ZJ 26 0 .44005E-•01 0 .21633 1 .0372 
DE12J 25 -0 .14866E-•02 0 .24716 -0 .30075E-01 
DE15J 25 0 .28155E-•01 0 .31027 0 .45373 
DE18J 25 0 .57924E-•01 0 .47178 0 ,61389 
DE21J 25 0 .90367E-•02 0 ,36554 0, 12361 
DE24J 24 -0 .11291E-•02 0 .39841 -0, 13883E-01 
DE27J 24 0 .54892E-•01 0, ,50703 0, 53037 
DE30J 24 0, ,10548 0, ,73529 0, 70280 
DEB6D 26 1, 2760 0, ,98243 6, ,6228*** 
DE3ZD 26 0, .17740E-•01 0, ,13557 0, ,66721 
DE6ZD 25 -0, 16305E-01 0, ,17993 -0, 45310 
DE9ZD 25 0. 14910E-01 0. ,20059 0, ,37164 
DE12D 25 -0. 14109E-02 0. 21508 -0. 32799E-01 
DE15D 25 0. 14877E-02 0. 32137 0. 23146E-01 
DE18D 24 -0. 12271E-01 0. 34015 -0, 17673 
DE21D 24 0. 10200E-01 0. 42793 0. 11677 
DE24D 24 0. 63855E-01 0. 71762 0. 43592 
DE27D 24 0. 37135E-01 0. 48370 0. 37611 
DE30D 23 0. 39268E-01 0. 45215 0. 41650 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
•^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.8.b. continued 
Series # Obs& Mean Stnd dvn" T 
DEB6J1 13 1 .1694 0 .61697 6 .8339*** 
DE3ZJ1 13 0 .60294E •01 0 .88684E-01 2 .4513** 
DE6ZJ1 13 0 .87545E -01 0 .20249 1 .5589 
DE9ZJ1 13 0 .48388E -01 0 .17892 0.97514 
DE12J1 13 0 .50055E -01 0 .29579 0 .61015 
DE15J1 13 0 .79667E -01 0 .29926 0 .95983 
DE18J1 13 0 .65525E -01 0 .32340 0 .73053 
DE21J1 13 0 .44341E •01 0 .32005 0 .49953 
DE24J1 12 -0.18961E -01 0 .36711 -0 .17892 
DE27J1 12 0 .54379E •01 0 .52948 0 .35577 
DE30J1 12 0 .16286 0 .92856 0 .60759 
DEB6J2 13 1 .1621 0 .54300 7, 7162*** 
DE3ZJ2 13 0 .98833E' •02 0 .11842 0 .30091 
DE6ZJ2 13 0 .11772E. •01 0 .13718 0, .30941 
DE9ZJ2 13 0 .39622E-•01 0 .25581 0, ,55845 
DE12J2 12 -0 .57324E-•01 0 .17691 -1, .1225 
DE15J2 12 -0 .27649E-•01 0 .32527 -0, 29445 
DE18J2 12 0 .49690E-•01 0, .60941 0, ,28246 
DE21J2 12 -0, .29209E-•01 0, ,42038 -0, 24070 
DE24J2 12 0 .16703E-•01 0 ,44320 0, ,13055 
DE27J2 12 0, ,55406E-•01 0, ,50712 0, ,37847 
DE30J2 12 0, ,48102E-•01 0, ,51092 0, 32614 
DEB6D1 13 1, ,4299 1, ,2544 4, 1101*** 
DE3ZD1 13 -0, 85633E-•02 0. 14727 -0, 20965 
DE6ZD1 13 -0. 28208E. •01 0. 23394 -0. 43475 
DE9ZD1 13 -0. ,69054E-•02 0. ,24565 -0. 10136 
DE12D1 13 -0, 33272E-01 0. 27105 -0, 44258 
DE15D1 13 0. 13025E-02 0, 41095 0. 11427E-01 
DE18D1 12 -0. 75165E-01 0. 33904 -0. 76798 
DE21D1 12 -0. 54943E-•01 0. 53171 -0. 35795 
DE24D1 12 0. 51787E-01 0. 97688 0. 18364 
DE27D1 12 -0. 18194E-01 0. 56685 -0. 11118 
DE30D1 12 0. 18170E-01 0. 46029 0. 13675 
DEB6D2 13 1. 1221 0. 62122 6. 5126*** 
DE3ZD2 13 0. 44042E-01 0. 12289 1. 2921 
DE6ZD2 12 -0. 34093E-02 0. 10286 -0. 11482 
DE9ZD2 12 0. 38543E-01 0. 14419 0. 92596 
DE12D2 12 0. 33105E-01 0. 13520 0. 84822 
DE15D2 12 0. 16884E-02 0. 20273 0. 28850E-01 
DE18D2 12 0. 50623E-01 0. 34400 0. 50977 
DE21D2 12 0. 75342E-01 0. 30152 0. 86559 
DE24D2 12 0. 75922E-01 0. 34950 0. 75251 
DE27D2 12 0. 92464E-01 0. 40150 0. 79777 
DE30D2 11 0. 62284E-01 0. 46432 0. 44489 
106 
Table B.9.a. Statistics for a six month rank period 
with no sugar contracts 
Series 4 Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn^ T-stat^ 
DEB6 56 0 .45906 0 .20553 16 .714*** 
DE3Z 56 0 .26039E-•01 0 .10416 1 .8706* 
DE6Z 55 0 ,74186E-•01 0 .17027 3 .2312*** 
DE9Z 55 0 .98155E-•01 0 .18123 4 .0167*** 
DE12 54 0 ,11557 0 .27667 3 .0697*** 
DE15 54 0, 87251E-•01 0 ,23496 2 .7288*** 
DE18 53 0, ,74100E-•01 0, 26071 2 .0692* 
DE21 53 0, ,65935E-•01 0, 28944 1 .6584 
DE24 52 0, 19409E-01 0, .31798 0 .44017 
DE27 52 -0, 67154E-02 0, ,31403 -0, .15420 
DE3G 51 -0, 35106E-01 0. 36431 -0, 68818 
DAB6 56 0. 25104 0, 14085 13, 338*** 
DA3Z 56 0. 32406E-01 0. 11517 2. ,1056** 
DA6Z 55 0. 64075E-01 0. 14785 3, 2140*** 
DA9Z 55 0. 80586E-01 0. 13373 4, ,4691*** 
DAI 2 54 0. 94881E-01 0. 18390 3, 7914*** 
DAI 5 54 0. 76159E-01 0. 17802 3. 1437*** 
DAI 8 53 0. 75133E-01 0. 21547 2. 5385** 
DA21 53 0. 77056E-01 0. 22131 2. 5348** 
DA24 52 0. 57333E-01 0. 22386 1. 8468* 
DA27 52 0. 28935E-01 0. 19790 1. 0543 
DA30 51 0. 30698E-01 0. 22771 0. 96275 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
^^Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
107 
Table B.9.b. Statistics for a six month rank period 
with no sugar contracts 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn" ! •  stat^ 
DEB6J 28 0 .42977 0 .22584 10.070*** 
DE3ZJ 28 0 .22109E -01 0 .97005E-01 1, ,2060 
DE6ZJ 28 0 .47599E -01 0 .17278 1. ,4577 
DE9ZJ 28 0 .70130E -01 0 .18178 2. 0414* 
DE12J 27 0 .78227E •01 0 .25841 1. 5730 
DE15J 27 0 .54156E--01 0 .22739 1. ,2375 
DE18J 27 0 .19592E •01 0 ,20137 0. 50555 
DE21J 27 0 .18218E-•03 0, .24241 0. 39050E-02 
DE24J 26 -0 .59633E-•01 0, ,28984 -1. 0491 
DE27J 26 -0 .59865E-•01 0, .33758 -0. 90424 
DE30J 26 -0 .65364E-•01 0, .36321 -0. 91763 
DEB6D 28 0, .48835 0, .18239 14. 168*** 
DE3ZD 28 0, .29968E-01 0, ,11252 1. 4093 
DE6ZD 27 0, ,10176 0, ,16632 3. 1791*** 
DE9ZD 27 0, ,12722 0. 17937 3. 6854*** 
DE12D 27 0, 15292 0. 29388 2. 7039*** 
DE15D 27 0. 12034 0. 24198 2. 5842** 
DE18D 26 0. 13070 0. 30440 2. 1895** 
DE21D 25 0. 13422 0. 32190 2. 1261** 
DE24D 25 0. 98452E-01 0. 33055 1. 5187 
DE27D 25 0. 46435E-01 0. 28520 0. 83018 
DE30D 25 -0. 36375E-02 0. 37021 -0. 49128E-01 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
Table B.9.b. continued 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn*^ T -staC^ 
DEB6J1 14 0 .39692 G .12973 11 .448*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 0 .54158E -01 0 .91672E-•01 2 .2105** 
DE6ZJ1 14 0 .70679E -01 0 .18469 1 .4319 
DE9ZJ1 14 0 .10278 0 .22737 1 .6914* 
DE12J1 14 0 .87479E -01 G .27442 1 .1927 
DE15J1 14 0 .38002E -01 G .19725 0 .72086 
DE18J1 14 0 .18437E •01 G .18757 0 .36778 
DE21J1 14 -0 .14854E -01 0 .23795 -0 .23358 
DE24J1 13 -0 .10934 0 .28288 -1 .3937 
DE27J1 13 -0 .13172 0 .37328 -1 .2723 
DE30J1 13 -0 .14262 G .38794 -1 .3255 
DEB6J2 14 0.46262 0 .29458 5 .8762*** 
DE3ZJ2 14 -0 .99397E •02 G .94487E-01 -G .39361 
DE6ZJ2 14 0 .24518E-•01 G .16354 0 .56096 
DE9ZJ2 14 0 .37478E-•01 0 .12100 1 .1589 
DE12J2 13 0 .68263E-•01 0 .25078 0 .98142 
DE15J2 13 0, ,71553E-•01 0 .26315 G .98038 
DE18J2 13 0, .2G836E-•01 G .22303 0 ,33684 
DE21J2 13 0, ,16375E-•01 G, 25580 0, 23082 
DE24J2 13 -0, ,99266E-•02 0 ,29940 -0, 11954 
DE27J2 13 0, ,11986E-•01 0. ,29478 0, 14661 
DE30J2 13 0, ,11891E-•01 0, ,33378 0, ,12845 
DEB6D1 14 0. 46592 0, ,17022 10, 242*** 
DE3ZD1 14 G, 54478E-•01 G. ,10629 1, ,9178* 
DE6ZD1 14 G. 14271 G, 18897 2, 8256*** 
DE9ZD1 14 0. 12935 G. 20016 2. 4180** 
DE12D1 14 0. 17868 0. 35482 1, 8842* 
DE15D1 14 G. 13G66 G. 24593 1, 9879* 
DE18D1 13 G. 14641 G. 31597 1. 6708 
DE21D1 13 G. 15077 G. 30472 1. 7840* 
DE24D1 13 0. 7G531E-01 0. 25057 1. G149 
DE27D1 13 0. 45474E-01 0. 24918 G. 65799 
DE30D1 13 G. 63773E-01 0. 36105 0. 63685 
DEB6D2 14 G. 51079 0. 19757 9. 6734*** 
DE3ZD2 14 0. 5458GE-02 G. 11706 0. 17446 
DE6ZD2 13 G. 57656E-01 0. 131G9 1. 5858 
DE9ZD2 13 G. 12493 0. 16216 2. 7776*** 
DE12D2 13 G. 12518 0. 22163 2. 0365** 
DE15D2 13 G. 10924 0. 24717 1. 5936 
DE18D2 13 G. 11499 G. 30441 1. 3620 
DE21D2 13 0. 11766 G. 34988 1. 2125 
DE24D2 13 G. 12637 0. 40392 1. 1280 
DE27D2 13 G. 47396E-01 0. 32767 0. 52152 
DE30D2 12 -G. 76665E-01 0. 38161 -0. 69594 
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Table B.lO.a. Statistics for a six month rank period 
with no spread portfolio 
Series # Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn*^ T-stat^ 
DEB6 56 0 .55270 0 .26854 15.402*** 
DE3Z 56 0 ,28614E-•01 0 .13072 1 .6381 
DE6Z 55 0.81708E-•01 0 .17842 3 .3963*** 
DE9Z 55 0. 11200 0 .21313 3 .8972*** 
DE12 54 0, ,12890 0 .29884 3 .1696*** 
DE15 54 0, ,10757 0 .30912 2 .5572** 
DE18 53 0, 82187E. •01 0 ,37085 1 .6134 
DE21 53 0. 92538E. •01 0 .48097 1 .4007 
DE24 52 0. 28712E-•01 0, ,59054 0 .35061 
DE27 52 -0. 37443E-•01 0, ,76583 -0 .35256 
DE30 51 -0. 41858E-01 0, ,74890 -0, 39915 
DAB6 56 0. 29346 0, ,16596 13 .232*** 
DA3Z 56 0. 34500E-01 0, 86848E-01 2 ,9727*** 
DA6Z 55 0. 62837E-01 0, ,13709 3 ,3994*** 
DA9Z 55 0. 80335E-01 0. ,15127 3, 9386*** 
DAI 2 54 0. 94330E-01 0. 22131 3, 1322*** 
DAI 5 54 0. 74966E-01 0. 23246 2, 3699** 
DAI 8 53 0.70685E-01 0. 26774 1, 9220* 
DA21 53 0. 77333E-01 0. 30735 1. ,8318* 
DA24 52 0. 47730E-01 0. 34792 0, 98926 
DA27 52 -0. 22976E-02 0. 38546 -0. ,42983E-( 
DA30 51 0. 77738E-02 0. 41310 0. 13439 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.lO.b. Statistics for a six month rank period 
with no spread portfolio 
Series # Obs& Mean Stnd dvn° T -statc 
DEB6J 28 0 .51823 0 .28421 9 .6486*** 
DE3ZJ 28 0 .38966E-•01 0 .14029 1 .4697 
DE6ZJ 28 0 .63984E-•01 0 .19707 1 .7180* 
DE9ZJ 28 0 .67791E-•01 0 .20090 1 .7856* 
DE12J 27 0 .75729E-01 0 .30001 1 .3116 
DE15J 27 0 .51378E-01 0 .33039 0, .80803 
DE18J 27 -0 .11225E-01 0 .36153 -0 .16133 
DE21J 27 -0 .44684E-01 0 .44381 -0, .52316 
DE24J 26 -0 .14865 0 .64592 -1, 1734 
DE27J 26 -0, .20384 0, ,98466 -1, 0556 
DE30J 26 -0 .18144 0 ,94585 -0, 97810 
DEB6D 28 0, ,58717 0, ,25232 12, 314*** 
DE3ZD 28 0, ,18262E-01 0. ,12208 0, ,79160 
DE6ZD 27 0, ,10009 0, ,15842 3. ,2829*** 
DE9ZD 27 0. 15785 0, 21942 3. 7381*** 
DEI2D 27 0. 18207 0, ,29354 3. 2229*** 
DE15D 27 0. 16376 0, 28118 3. 0263*** 
DE18D 26 0. 17919 0. 36182 2. 5253** 
DE21D 26 0. 23504 0. 48464 2. 4729** 
DE24D 26 0. 20607 0. 47831 2. 1968** 
DE27D 26 0. 12896 0. 41147 1. 5981 
DE30D 25 0. 10330 0. 43984 1. 1743 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.lO.b. continued 
Series // Obs& Mean Stnd dvn T -stat^ 
DEB6J1 14 0 .49946 0 .18844 9 .9171*** 
DE3ZJ1 14 0 .81952E -01 0 .14808 2 .0708* 
DE6ZJ1 14 0 .10223 0 .18202 2 .1014** 
DE9ZJ1 14 0 .96505E -01 0 .24491 1 .4744 
DE12J1 14 0 .79511E -01 0 .27876 1 .0672 
DE15J1 14 0 .22033E -01 0 .29967 0 .27510 
DE18J1 14 -0 .33706E -01 0 .41163 -0 .30638 
DE21J1 14 -0 .79461E -01 0 .55045 -0 .54013 
DE24J1 13 -0 .26319 0 .84070 -1 .1287 
DE27J1 13 -0 .40741 1 .3508 -1 .0874 
DE30J1 13 -0 .35051 1 .2857 -0 .98295 
DEB6J2 14 0 .53699 0 .36262 5 .5410*** 
DE3ZJ2 14 -0 .40191E-•02 0 .12235 -0 ,12291 
DE5ZJ2 14 0 .25741E-• 01 0 .21066 0 .45721 
DE9ZJ2 14 0 .39077E-•01 0 .14855 0 .98426 
DE12J2 13 0 .71656E-•01 0 .33286 0 .77619 
DE15J2 13 0 .82981E-•01 0, ,37033 0 ,80792 
DE18J2 13 0 .12986E-•01 0, .31370 0 .14925 
DE21J2 13 -0 ,72313E-•02 0, ,30916 -0 ,84334E-i 
DE24J2 13 -0 .34105E-•01 0, ,36604 -0, 33595 
DE27J2 13 -0, ,28186E-•03 0, 32472 -0, 31296E-i 
DE30J2 13 -0, ,12359E-01 0, ,38581 -0, 11550 
DEB6D1 14 0, ,54729 0. ,17093 11, ,980*** 
DE3ZD1 14 0. ,17781E-•01 0. 13132 0. ,50662 
DE6ZD1 14 0. 10290 0. 15117 2, 5471** 
DE9ZD1 14 0. ,97231E-•01 0. 21523 1, ,6903* 
DE12D1 14 0. 15601 0. 33259 1, ,7551* 
DE15D1 14 0. 17399 0. 32321 2. 0142** 
DE18D1 13 0. 20546 0. 43475 1. ,7039* 
DE21D1 13 0. 33380 0. 62580 1, 9232* 
DE24D1 13 0. 29049 0. 56679 1, 8479* 
DE27D1 13 0. 20590 0. 33342 2. 2265** 
DE30D1 13 0. 25634 0. 33348 2, 7715** 
DEB6D2 14 0. 62705 0. 31557 7. 4349*** 
DE3ZD2 14 0. 18743E-01 0. 11707 0. 59907 
DE6ZD2 13 0. 97059E-01 0. 17205 2. 0340** 
DE9ZD2 13 0. 22314 0. 21267 3. 7830*** 
DE12D2 13 0. 21013 0. 25536 2. 9669*** 
DE15D2 13 0. 15275 0. 24058 2. 2892** 
DE18D2 13 0. 15293 0. 28677 1. 9228* 
DE21D2 13 0. 13628 0. 27670 1. 7757* 
DE24D2 13 0. 12165 0. 37407 1. 1725 
DE27D2 13 0. 52021E-01 0. 47827 0. 39218 
DE30D2 12 -0. 62483E-01 0. 49306 -0. 43899 
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Table B.ll. Statistics for a fifteen month rank period 
with no spread portfolios 
Series Mean Pld Stnd dvn^ T-statD 
DE3Z 0.0088 0.0972 0.4685 
DE6Z 0.0431 0.1930 1.144 
DE9Z 0.0536 0.2067 1.329 
DE12 0.0275 0.3162 0.441 
DE15 -0.0312 0.3016 -0.525 
DE18 -0.0717 0.4163 -0.866 
DE21 -0.0907 0.4141 -1.100 
DE24 -0.0999 0.4683 -1.061 
^Pooled standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is zero. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
•^^Significant at the .05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table B.12. Comparing interest rates and 
inflation 
Inflation Interest 
Year rate rate 
1964 1 1 .01309 1.04090 
1965 1 1 01722 1.04460 
1966 1 1 .02857 1.05440 
1967 1 1 02881 1.05550 
1968 1 1 04200 1.06170 
1969 1 1 05374 1.08050 
1970 1 1 05920 1.09110 
1971 1 1 04299 1.05660 
1972 1 1 03298 1.04620 
1973 1 1 06225 1.07930 
1974 1 1 10969 1.11030 
1975 1 1 09140 1.07240 
1976 1 1 05769 1.05700 
1977 1 1 06452 1.05280 
1978 1 1 07603 1.07780 
1979 1 1 11470 1.10880 
1980 1 1 13459 1.11370 
1981 1 1 10243 1.17630 
1982 1 1 05986 1.14600 
1983 1 1 03222 1.09370 
1984 1 1 04431 1.11110 
1985 1 1 03568 1.08350 
1986 1 1 01924 1.07310 
1987 1 1 03568 1.06550 
1988 1 1 04137 NA 
1989 1 1 04793 NA 
1990 1 1 05396 NA 
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Table B.13. Count of winners and losers for a twelve month 
rank period 
Total Total Extreme Extreme 
Futures extreme winner winner loser Standard 
// code % % % % deviation 
44 HU 76 .9% 69 .2% 61 .5% 15 .4% 0 .21671 
15 WO 71 .4% 33 .3% 28 .6% 42 .9% 0 .27151 
13 WR 71 .4% 14 .3% 9 .5% 61 .9% 0 .19191 
35 SB 69 .1% 43 .6% 25 .5% 43 .6% 0 .40323 
32 KG 65 .7% 57 .1% 40 .0% 25 .7% 0 .24881 
23 PA 65 .5% 44 .8% 34 .5% 31 .0% 0 .34233 
24 PL 60 .9% 41 .3% 23 .9% 37 .0% 0, .27214 
18 LH 60 .0% 60 .0% 44 .4% 15 .6% 0 .20770 
34 JO 58 .3% 56 .3% 37 .5% 20 .8% 0 .26013 
31 CC 58 .2% 38 .2% 25 .5% 32 .7% 0, ,34520 
10 WB 57 .1% 33 .3% 14 .3% 42 .9% 0 ,16713 
53 NR 55 .6% 66 .7% 33 ,3% 22 .2% 0 .52783 
14 WW 52 .4% 38 .1% 33, ,3% 19 .0% 0 ,17666 
11 WF 52 .4% 19 .0% 9, .5% 42 .9% 0, .16404 
5 SO 50, .9% 49 .1% 27, ,3% 23, ,6% 0, ,30493 
21 HG 50 ,9% 56, .4% 29, ,1% 21, .8% 0, ,26324 
19 PB 49 .1% 49, .1% 23, ,6% 25, ,5% 0, ,23860 
33 LB 48, ,8% 48, ,8% 22, ,0% 26, ,8% 0, ,19527 
22 GC 48 ,5% 42, .4% 18, ,2% 30 ,3% 0, ,23986 
36 SE 46, ,7% 53. ,3% 20, ,0% 26, ,7% 0, ,20936 
2 CT 45, ,8% 54, ,2% 29, 2% 16, ,7% 0, ,21546 
25 SI 45, ,5% 38. 2% 18, 2% 27, ,3% 0, ,42567 
47 SP 44, ,4% 77. 8% 33. ,3% 11, ,1% 0, ,12004 
49 YX 44, 4% 72. 2% 33. ,3% 11, , 1% 0, ,11957 
62 CZLH 44. 4% 33. 3% 13. 3% 31. 1% 0, 11298 
42 CL 43. 8% 62. 5% 31. 3% 12. ,5% 0. ,22558 
51 GN 40. 0% 55. 0% 30. 0% 10. 0% 0. 08767 
30 SF 39. 4% 39. 4% 21. 2% 18. ,2% 0. ,10249 
43 HO 39. 1% 60. 9% 30. 4% 8. 7% 0. 14841 
3 OZ 36. 4% 34. 5% 7. 3% 29. 1% 0. 17830 
50 KV 33. 3% 55. 6% 22. 2% 11. 1% 0. 14930 
54 GGSI 33. 3% 60. 6% 21. 2% 12. 1% 0. 10401 
41 US 33. 3% 48. 1% 25. 9% 7. 4% 0. 09091 
16 FC 32. 4% 59. 5% 24. 3% 8. 1% 0. 13327 
4 SM 30. 9% 50. 9% 16. 4% 14. 5% 0. 32242 
7 WZ 30. 9% 40.0% 12. 7% 18. 2% 0. 20078 
12 RS 28. 6% 23. 8% 9. 5% 19. 0% 0. 18229 
29 JY 28. 6% 46. 4% 17. 9% 10. 7% 0. 10961 
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Table B.13. continued 
Total Total Extreme Extreme 
Futures extreme winner winner loser Standard 
# code % % % % deviation 
20 BL 27 .8% 50 .0% 11 .1% 16 .7% 0 .21857 
1 CZ 27 .3% 41 .8% 10 .9% 16 .4% 0 .17974 
28 DM 27 .3% 45 .5% 15 .2% 12 . 1% 0 .09247 
52 PW 25 .9% 44 .4% 11 .1% 14 .8% 0 .21230 
27 BP 25 .0% 56 .3% 15 .6% 9 .4% 0 .10202 
60 CZLC 24 .5% 24 .5% 5 .7% 18 .9% 0 .08596 
9 MW 23 .8% 35 .7% 9 .5% 14 .3% 0 .19283 
56 CZWZ 23 .6% 45 .5% 7 .3% 16 .4% 0 .08315 
8 KW 23 .3% 40 .0% 13 .3% 10 .0% 0 .14813 
39 TY 22 .2% 61 . 1% 22 .2% 0 .0% 0 .06703 
6 SZ 21 .8% 45, .5% 12, ,7% 9 .1% 0, 23222 
61 CZFG 21 .6% 29, ,7% 13, .5% 8 .1% 0 .11773 
57 SZCT 20, .8% 47, ,9% 6, ,3% 14 .6% 0, 11044 
17 LC 20, ,8% 67, ,9% 17, ,0% 3, .8% 0, ,12285 
48 DX 18, 2% 36, ,4% 0, ,0% 18, ,2% 0, ,07342 
59 LCLH 17, ,8% 40, ,0% 6, ,7% 11, ,1% 0, ,06973 
58 LHFB 15, ,6% 75. ,6% 15, ,6% 0, ,0% 0, ,07895 
55 CZSZ 14. ,5% 50, 9% 3. 6% 10, ,9% 0, 06547 
64 SZSMSO 10. 9% 36. 4% 3. 6% 7. ,3% 0, 03674 
66 TBUS 7. 4% 48. 1% 7. 4% 0, ,0% 0, ,03652 
37 ED 5. 6% 83. 3% 5. 6% 0. 0% 0, 02159 
63 FCCZLC 5. 4% 35. 1% 0. 0% 5. 4% 0, 04607 
26 CD 3. 3% 46. 7% 3, 3% 0. 0% 0, 03481 
38 TB 3. 2% 61. 3% 3, 2% 0. 0% 0. 02194 
40 FY 0. 0% 83. 3% 0. 0% 0. 0% 0. 05000 
46 MB 0. 0% 75. 0% 0, 0% 0. 0% 0. 04632 
45 CR 0. 0% 44. 4% 0, 0% 0. 0% 0, 04632 
65 TEED 0. 0% 22. 2% 0. 0% 0. 0% 0. 00334 
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Table B.14. Count regressions for six month 
and twelve month rank period 
R- Standard 
Dependent variable squared Beta deviation 
Six month rank period 
Total extreme percent 0 .555 1 .425 0, .159 
Extreme winner percent 0 .285 0 .582 0 ,115 
Extreme loser percent 0 .520 G .843 0, ,101 
Total winner percent 0 .048 -0, 274 0, ,152 
Twelve month rank period 
Total extreme percent 0, ,536 1, ,395 0, 162 
Extreme winner percent 0. 293 0. 642 0. 125 
Extreme loser percent 0. 382 0. 753 0. 120 
Total winner percent 0. 006 -0. 111 0. 176 
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Table B.15. Count of winners and losers for a six month 
rank period 
Total Total Extreme Extreme 
Futures extreme winner winner loser Standard 
# code % % % % deviation 
35 SB 80 .4% 41 .1% 32 .1% 48 .2% 0 .40323 
13 WR 72 .7% 22 .7% 18 .2% 54 .5% 0 .19191 
44 HU 71 .4% 71 .4% 50 .0% 21 .4% 0 .21671 
15 WO 68 .2% 36.4% 27 .3% 40 .9% 0 .27151 
23 PA 66 .7% 50 .0% 26 .7% 40 .0% 0 .34233 
42 CL 64 .7% 47 .1% 41 .2% 23 .5% 0 .22558 
32 KC 63 .9% 52 .8% 33 ,3% 30 ,6% 0 .24881 
34 JO 59 .2% 55 .1% 32 .7% 26 .5% 0.26013 
5 SO 58 .9% 46 .4% 32 .1% 26 .8% 0 .30493 
19 PB 58 .9% 50 .0% 28 .6% 30 .4% 0 .23860 
43 HO 58 .3% 58 .3% 37 .5% 20 .8% 0, .14841 
22 GC 55 .9% 38 .2% 23 .5% 32 .4% 0, ,23986 
14 WW 54 .5% 45, .5% 36 .4% 18 ,2% 0, ,17666 
24 PL 53 .2% 42 .6% 19 . 1% 34 .0% 0, 27214 
31 CC 51 .8% 42 .9% 26 .8% 25 ,0% 0, ,34520 
53 NR 50 .0% 50 .0% 20 .0% 30 .0% 0, ,52783 
2 CT 49 .0% 46, ,9% 26, ,5% 22, .4% 0, ,21546 
18 LH 47, .8% 58, ,7% 34, ,8% 13, ,0% 0. ,20770 
50 KV 47, .4% 68, .4% 31, ,6% 15 ,8% 0, ,14930 
25 SI 46, ,4% 37, .5% 16, . 1% 30, ,4% 0, ,42567 
11 WF 45, ,5% 22. ,7% 13, ,6% 31, 8% 0. ,16404 
52 PW 42, ,9% 50. ,0% 21. ,4% 21, ,4% 0. 21230 
47 SP 42. ,1% 73. 7% 36. ,8% 5. ,3% 0. 12004 
20 BL 42. ,1% 47. 4% 21. , 1% 21, ,1% 0. 21857 
3 OZ 41. ,1% 46. 4% 12, ,5% 28. ,6% 0. 17830 
33 LB 40. 5% 54. 8% 19. 0% 21.4% 0. 19527 
21 HG 39. 3% 57. 1% 23. 2% 16. 1% 0. 26324 
4 SM 37. 5% 53. 6% 21. 4% 16. 1% 0. 32242 
62 CZLH 37. 0% 37. 0% 13. 0% 23. 9% 0. 11298 
49 YX 36. 8% 73. 7% 31. 6% 5. 3% 0. 11957 
28 DM 35. 3% 50, 0% 20. 6% 14. 7% 0. 09247 
29 JY 34. 5% 48. 3% 20. 7% 13. 8% 0. 10961 
48 DX 33. 3% 33, 3% 8. 3% 25. 0% 0. 07342 
54 GCSI 32. 4% 58. 8% 14. 7% 17. 6% 0. 10401 
36 SE 32. 3% 51. 6% 9. 7% 22. 6% 0. 20936 
10 WB 31. 8% 22. 7% 9. 1% 22. 7% 0. 16713 
30 SF 29. 4% 50. 0% 17. 6% 11. 8% 0. 10249 
12 RS 27. 3% 22. 7% 9. 1% 18. 2% 0. 18229 
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Table B.15. continued 
Total Total Extreme Extreme 
Futures extreme winner winner loser Standard 
// code % % % % deviation 
27 BP 27 .3% 54 .5% 9 .1% 18.2% 0 .10202 
7 WZ 26 .8% 44 .6% 8 .9% 17 .9% 0 .20078 
56 CZWZ 25 .0% 50 .0% 10 .7% 14 .3% 0 .08315 
41 US 25 .0% 53 .6% 17 .9% 7 . 1% 0 .09091 
17 LC 24 .1% 59 .3% 20 .4% 3 .7% 0 ,12285 
58 LHPB 23 .9% 73 .9% 23 .9% 0 .0% 0 .07895 
51 GN 23 .8% 57 .1% 19 .0% 4 .8% 0, .08767 
9 MW 23 .3% 39, ,5% 11 .6% 11 .6% 0, ,19283 
6 SZ 23 ,2% 42, .9% 12 .5% 10 .7% 0, 23222 
8 KW 22 .6% 51, ,6% 12, ,9% 9 .7% 0, ,14813 
1 CZ 21 .4% 44, ,6% 12, .5% 8 .9% 0. 17974 
61 CZFC 21, ,1% 44, ,7% 15, ,8% 5 .3% 0, ,11773 
57 SZGT 20.4% 51, ,0% 6, ,1% 14 .3% 0, ,11044 
60 CZLC 18, ,5% 35, ,2% 5, ,6% 13 .0% 0, ,08596 
55 CZSZ 17, .9% 46. 4% 3. ,6% 14, .3% 0, ,06547 
59 LCLH 17, ,4% 45, ,7% 6, ,5% 10 .9% 0, ,06943 
16 EC 15, 8% 60. 5% 10, ,5% 5, ,3% 0, ,13327 
39 TY 15, ,8% 68. 4% 15, ,8% 0, .0% 0, ,06703 
46 MB 15. 4% 76. 9% 7. 7% 7, .7% 0, 06296 
66 TBUS 10, ,7% 50. 0% 10. 7% 0, ,0% 0, ,03652 
64 SZSMSO 8. 9% 39. 3% 3. 6% 5, ,4% 0. 03674 
26 CD 6. 5% 51. 6% 3. 2% 3. ,2% 0. 03481 
63 FCCZLC 5. 3% 44. 7% 2. 6% 2. ,6% 0. 04607 
45 CR 0. 0% 60. 0% 0. 0% 0. ,0% 0. 04632 
37 ED 0. 0% 73. 7% 0. 0% 0. ,0% 0. 02159 
38 TB 0. 0% 68. 8% 0. 0% 0. 0% 0. 02194 
40 FY 0. 0% 71. 4% 0. 0% 0. 0% 0. 04000 
65 TBED 0. 0% 21. 1% 0. 0% 0. 0% 0. 00334 
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Table B.16. Rank period statistics 
Series // Obs& Mean Stnd dvn^ T-statC 
Six month rank period 
EXWB6 56 1.2961 0.22626 9.7941*** 
EXLB6 56 0.80480 0.59067E-01 -24.730*** 
ALWB6 56 1.1508 0.11433 9.8709*** 
ALLB6 56 0.89065 0.45730E-01 -17.894*** 
Twelve month rank period 
EXWB6 55 1.4973 0.40945 9.0078*** 
EXLB6 55 0.72807 0.85076E-01 -23.705*** 
ALWB6 55 1.2395 0.16619 10.689*** 
ALLB6 55 0.85474 0.40138E-01 -26.839*** 
Fifteen month rank period 
EXWB6 54 1.6098 0.53217 8.4205*** 
EXLB6 54 0.70116 0.92243E-01 -23.807*** 
ALWB6 54 1.2895 0.20728 10.263*** 
ALLB6 54 0.83523 0.41256E-01 -29.349*** 
Eighteen month rank period 
EXWB6 54 1.7126 0.66577 7.8659*** 
EXLB6 54 0.67257 0.97397E-01 -24.704*** 
ALWB6 54 1.3312 0.24454 9.9521*** 
ALLB6 54 0.82233 0.42724E-01 -30.558*** 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is one. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
Table B.16. continued 
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Series // Obs® Mean Stnd dvn*^ T-stat^ 
Twenty-four month rank period 
EXWB6 53 1.8856 0.88371 7.2960*** 
EXLB6 53 0.64643 0.10112 -25.454*** 
ALWB6 53 1.4125 0.31913 9.4106*** 
ALLB6 53 0.80280 0.43399E-01 -33.080*** 
Thirty-six month rank period 
EXWB6 51 2.1855 1.1266 7.5143*** 
EXLB6 51 0.91957 0.42476E-01 -13.522*** 
ALWB6 51 1.5512 0.40837 9.6399*** 
ALLB6 51 0.77536 0.46710E-01 -34.345*** 
Six month rank, no sugar 
EXWB6 56 1.2797 0.21499 9.7370*** 
EXLB6 56 0.82068 0.59883E-01 -22.409*** 
ALWB6 56 1.1474 0.11282 9.7757*** 
ALLB6 56 0.89633 0.47561E-01 -16.311*** 
Six month rank, no spreads 
EXWB6 56 1.3415 0.27610 9.2554*** 
EXLB6 56 0.78879 0.71424E-01 -22.129*** 
ALWB6 56 1.1673 0.11196 11.184*** 
ALLB6 56 0.87387 0.77157E-01 -12.233*** 
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Table B.17. Statistics for returns to buy-and-hold 
portfolios 
Series # Obs* Mean Stnd dvn^ T-stat° 
Six month rank period 
GRNB6 56 1.0222 0 .87646E •01 1 .8990* 
GRN3 56 1.0057 0 .35761E. •01 1 .2002 
GRJN6 55 1.0238 0 .89146E-•01 1 .9802* 
GRN9 55 1.0287 0 .93262E-•01 2 .2815** 
GRN12 54 1.0540 0 .16267 2 .4411** 
GRN15 54 1.0608 0 .16421 2 .7201*** 
GRN18 53 1.0929 0 .24240 2 .7896*** 
GRN21 53 1.0967 0 ,24435 2 .8808*** 
GRN24 52 1.1282 0 .30608 3 .0202*** 
GRN27 52 1.1301 0 ,30622 3 .0646*** 
GRN30 51 1.1597 0, ,34786 3 .2784*** 
Twelve month rank period 
GRNB6 55 1.0517 0. 15960 2, 4038** 
GRN3 55 1.0047 0. 36154E-01 0. ,97166 
GRN6 54 1.0234 0. 90583E-01 1, 8993* 
GRN9 54 1.0287 0. 95667E-01 2, 2051** 
GRN12 53 1.0547 0. 16565 2, 4054** 
GRN15 53 1.0615 0. 16695 2. ,6829*** 
GRN18 52 1.0925 0. 24501 2. 7224*** 
GRN21 52 1.0954 0. 24625 2. 7926*** 
GRN24 51 1.1254 0. 30838 2. 9048*** 
GRN27 51 1.1273 0. 30912 2. 9418*** 
GRN30 50 1.1566 0. 35012 3. 1634*** 
^Number of observations. 
^Standard deviation. 
^T-statistic tests whether mean is one. 
^Significant at the .10 level. 
^^Significant at the ,05 level. 
***Significant at the .01 level. 
Table B.17. continued 
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Series // Obs^ Mean Stnd dvn^ T-stat^ 
Six month rank, no sugar 
GRNB6 56 1 .0244 0 .87690E-01 2 ,0801** 
GRN3 56 1, .0065 0 .35141E-01 1, 3936 
GRN6 55 1, 0254 0 .88008E-01 2, 1375** 
GRN9 55 1, 0291 0, .90089E-01 2, 3978** 
GRN12 54 1, 0544 0, ,15773 2, 5322** 
GRN15 54 1, ,0592 0, ,15442 2, 8190*** 
GRN18 53 1, ,0893 0. ,23050 2, 8211*** 
GRN21 53 1. ,0908 0, ,21816 3, 0308*** 
GRN24 52 1. ,1172 0, ,28022 3, 0151*** 
GRN27 52 1, ,1162 0, ,26224 3, 1963*** 
GRN30 51 1. 1439 0. 30962 3. 3190*** 
Six month rank, no spreads 
GRNB6 56 1, .0317 0 .11899 1.9942* 
GRN3 56 1, 0088 0 .49944E-01 1.3135 
GRN6 55 1, ,0336 0 .12168 2.0463** 
GRN9 55 1, 0420 0 .12685 2.4538** 
GRN12 54 1. ,0762 0, .22124 2.5313** 
GRN15 54 1, ,0875 0 ,22398 2.8709*** 
GRN18 53 1, ,1311 0, ,33003 2.8922*** 
GRN21 53 1. 1387 0. ,33256 3.0371*** 
GRN24 52 1. 1822 0, ,41846 3.1396*** 
GRN27 52 1. 1878 0, ,41991 3.2244*** 
GRN30 51 1. 2291 0, ,47921 3.4141*** 
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APPENDIX C: 
GRAPHS OF RESULTS 
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Figure C.l. A 90% and 98% confidence interval for differences of 
extreme portfolio means for a six month rank period 
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Figure C.2. A 90% and 98% confidence interval for differences of 
extreme portfolio means for a twelve moth rank period 
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Figure C.3. A 90% and 98% confidence interval for differences of 
extreme portfolio means for a fifteen moth rank period 
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Figure C.4. A 90% and 98% confidence interval for mean returns to a 
buy-and-hold portfolio for a six month rank period 
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Figure C.5. A 90% and 98% confidence interval for mean returns to a 
buy-and-hold portfolio for a six month rank period with 
no spread positions in the sample 
